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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Effects of Irrelevant Information and Minor Errors in Client Documents on 
Assessments of Misstatement Risk and Sample Size 
 
By Edward Lynch, Ph.D., CPA 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2017 
 
Director: Alisa Brink, Ph.D., KPMG Teaching Excellence Fellow, Associate Professor of 
Accounting, School of Business 
 
This dissertation consists of three studies. The first study conducts a 2 by 2 experiment to 
examine how auditors are influenced by the presence of irrelevant information and minor errors 
(i.e., “dirty documents”) when reviewing audit evidence produced by the client. This study tasks 
97 public accountants to review audit evidence and finds some evidence that dirty documents 
influence an auditor’s assessment of the likelihood of account misstatement and the appropriate 
sample size.  
In order to demonstrate the usefulness of eye-tracking and to help generate potential 
research topics, the second study reviews extant literature in other disciplines where eye-tracking 
technology is applied to various judgment and decision-making contexts. This study suggests how 
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eye-tracking can enhance extant accounting research. Illustrative examples of promising research 
opportunities (extending extant research) are provided. In addition, this study identifies how eye-
tracking can be applied to more contemporary decision making and educational circumstances. 
The third study extends the first experiment through the use of eye-tracking technology. 
This study utilizes the same 2 by 2 experiment as the first study, but in this case records the eye 
movements of 43 auditing students while they review the audit evidence. The eye-tracking 
technology provides additional detail as to the specific evidence participants’ focus on during their 
review. This study finds that participants focus their attention differently depending on whether 
irrelevant information or minor errors were present.  
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PART 1: The Effects of Irrelevant Information and Minor Errors in Client 
Documents on Auditor Decisions 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Reliable financial reporting is essential to maintaining confidence in our capital 
markets. Audits are one mechanism that assist in maintaining reliable financial reporting 
and create value for a number of stakeholders (e.g., investors, analysts, trade exchanges, 
audit committees, client management, internal auditors, as well as external audit firms). 
One important feature of every audit is the application of professional skepticism. The 
auditor's daily exposure to increasingly unique and complex transactions, the expanded use 
of judgment based estimates and measurements, and the emergence of big data all 
contribute to an ongoing awareness of the need to properly apply professional skepticism 
(Glover and Prawitt 2013).  
This study examines the influence of client provided “dirty documents” on auditors’ 
skeptical judgments and actions. For purposes of this study, a “dirty document” is defined 
as a client produced record that contains irrelevant information and/or minor errors. 
Irrelevant information is extraneous information. Minor errors are errors that are 
immaterial to the related account balance as well as to the overall financial results and do 
not appear to be intentional or deceptive. However, although immaterial and unintentional, 
minor errors may accumulate to a level (or form a pattern) that triggers an adjustment to 
an auditor's assessment of risk. This study also examines whether dirty documents 
contribute to over auditing, which is a waste of financial resources and an unnecessarily 
stressful misuse of audit staff. Onsite auditors interact daily with the client's staff (e.g., 
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requesting documents and related clarification). Therefore, an important aspect of the daily 
auditor-client relationship centers around the quality of the client records provided to the 
auditor; and the subsequent potential impact that the quality of the record has on the 
auditor's application of professional skepticism.1   
This study also examines the role of professional skepticism in the evaluation of 
dirty documents. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) defines 
professional skepticism as an attitude that includes a questioning mind, being alert to 
conditions that may indicate possible misstatement due to fraud or error, and a critical 
assessment of audit evidence (AS 1015). However, in practice the appropriate level of 
professional skepticism rises and falls along a continuum or range of auditor behavior 
depending on the circumstances (Glover and Prawitt 2013). In addition, applying the 
appropriate level of professional skepticism requires achieving a balance between 
gathering evidence and documentation vs. audit effectiveness and efficiency (including 
controlling costs).  
To examine how auditors are influenced by dirty documents, this study conducts 
an experiment with 100 participants that have public accounting experience. In a 
computerized task, participants assume the role of a staff auditor in completing the 
accounts receivable portion of an audit. Participants review the audit evidence and then 
assess the likelihood of account misstatement and the appropriate sample size. The 
presence of irrelevant information and the presence of minor errors is then manipulated 
between conditions. This paper examines three aspects related to auditor skepticism: trait 
skepticism, skeptical judgment, and skeptical action. Trait skepticism is a measured 
                                                          
1 To illustrate, Mr. Paul Meyer, Regional Audit Director at Cherry, Bekaert, LLP, acknowledged dirty 
documents as “a frequent occurrence that could potentially influence an auditor’s assessment of risk.”  
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independent variable captured using the Hurtt scale (2010). Skeptical judgment and 
skeptical action are dependent variables that are captured from participants’ responses after 
viewing the case materials. 
With respect to the underlying behavioral theory, this study posits that the quality 
of client records influences the application of professional skepticism. Specifically, when 
auditors encounter client records contaminated with irrelevant information and/or minor 
errors, how are their judgments and actions impacted? Recent research suggests process 
accountability theory and epistemic motivation are related to higher quality auditor 
judgment (e.g., Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, Peytcheva, and Wright 2013). Process 
accountability is the expectation (regardless of the final outcome) of having to justify your 
decision to others (Tetlock 1983; Siegel-Jacobs and Yates 1996). Epistemic motivation is 
the desire to fully understand the problem at hand (Kruglanski 1989; Dreu and Carnevale 
2003; Scholten, Van Knippenberg, Nijstad, and Dreu 2007).  
Process accountability and epistemic motivation suggest that auditors encountering 
dirty client records will perform more extensive audit testing than they otherwise would 
with clean records. The same logic applies to irrelevant information and minor errors 
operating separately. Auditors encountering irrelevant information and minor errors in 
client provided records are expected to seek out additional explanations or perform 
additional procedures and consequently make more skeptical judgments. 
This study offers numerous contributions to the literature. First, the results show 
that as much as 30 percent of an auditor’s time on-site can involve cleaning up dirty client 
documents. This is an important result because this additional work not only impacts audit 
efficiency and cost, but also contributes to auditor stress and burnout. Second, this study 
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finds that an auditor's skeptical judgment and action are impacted by both irrelevant 
information and/or minor errors. This finding suggests that dirty documents contribute to 
inefficient auditing. The results indicate that the presence of minor errors in audit evidence 
leads to increases in the estimates of account misstatement likelihood and leads to increases 
in sample size. When irrelevant information is present, auditors keep the likelihood of 
misstatement constant, but respond by increasing the sample size. This suggests that the 
presence of irrelevant information does not immediately cause auditors to conclude that 
misstatements are more likely to occur, but still results in a more questioning mindset 
leading to a larger sample size. 
Third, this study examines how dirty documents influence auditors with different 
levels of trait skepticism. Results indicate that trait skepticism does not influence an 
auditor’s skeptical judgments or actions. Specifically, this result suggests that auditors 
(regardless of their trait skepticism level) make similar skeptical judgments and take 
similar action with respect to sample size. Perhaps the similar judgments and actions across 
auditors with different trait skepticism levels indicates that auditor training acts as a 
modifier for trait skepticism. 
Fourth, this study is the first to use evidence that is experienced first-hand by the 
auditor. Specifically, this study simulates use of records, containing irrelevant information 
and minor errors, that are produced directly by the client versus the less personal second-
hand anecdotal evidence used in previous research (e.g., Hackenbrack 1992). The more 
applied context adds a personal and possibly a more relevant and/or realistic experience to 
the research setting. In addition, the significance of a more applied context is that a dirty 
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record prepared directly by the client may contribute to the auditor’s ongoing assessment 
of client competence.  
Fifth, this study provides evidence that a dilution effect does not always occur when 
auditors are provided with superfluous information. Prior literature using second-hand 
anecdotal evidence finds that the strength of auditor decisions is reduced when auditors are 
provided with irrelevant information (e.g., Hoffman and Patton 1997; Shelton 1999). This 
study’s audit setting utilizes records produced directly by the client (and therefore 
experienced first-hand by the auditor) and finds no dilution effect occurs. 
The results of this study should be useful to audit firms, clients and regulators who 
have an interest in both the application of professional skepticism as well as avoiding the 
time and expense associated with unnecessary auditing. First, the results should be useful 
to audit firms, since they are continuously balancing audit risk and available auditor work 
hours while avoiding the time and expense associated with unnecessary auditing. Second, 
the results should be important to audit clients, who also are concerned with avoiding the 
time and expense associated with unnecessary auditing. This study may also start a dialog 
on the politically incorrect and controversial issue of what is the acceptable likelihood of 
audit failure? Finally, the results may encourage a discussion to expand the PCAOB 
definition of professional skepticism to recognize a concomitant obligation to avoiding 
unnecessary auditing.    
This rest of this study is organized into the following sections: Section II reviews 
the current accounting literature on skepticism; Section III reviews the theories supporting 
the hypotheses in Experiment 1, and concludes with my hypotheses; Section IV describes 
the design of Experiment 1 including details about the participants, experimental task, as 
6 
 
well as the independent and dependent variables; Section V describes the results; and 
Section VI provides conclusions on Experiment 1.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Professional Skepticism 
 The word skepticism comes from the root word “skeptic”, which comes from the 
Greek word “skeptikos”, meaning inquiring or reflective (Glover and Prawitt 2013). 
Therefore, someone labeled as being skeptical could also be described as having a 
questioning mind, or as being doubtful. In an auditing context, the “presumptive doubt” 
mindset defines professional skepticism as an attitude that includes a questioning mind and 
critical assessment of audit evidence (e.g., Nelson 2009; PCAOB 2012; Carpenter and 
Reimers 2013).2 Other studies (e.g., Bamber, Ramsay, and Tubbs 1997; Cushing 2003; 
Hurrt 2007) assert that unless there is evidence to the contrary, the auditor's mindset should 
be neutral (i.e., no presumption one way or the other as to management carelessness, 
incompetence or fraud). In AU-C 200, the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) defines professional skepticism as “an attitude that includes a 
questioning mind, being alert to conditions that may indicate possible misstatement due to 
error or fraud (2012).” However, it also states that “[an] auditor neither assumes that 
management is dishonest nor assumes unquestioned honesty (2012)”. Glover and Prawitt 
(2013) conceptualize the application of professional skepticism as falling along a 
continuum ranging from complete doubt to total trust.3 In practice an auditor’s application 
                                                          
2 The PCAOB statutory regulations require a neutral mindset (i.e., "The auditor neither assumes that 
management is dishonest nor assumes unquestioned honesty."). However, the Staff Audit Practice Alert 
excludes this requirement from its overview of professional skepticism and due professional care. 
Therefore, this study views the Staff Audit Practice Alert as encouraging a presumption of doubt mindset.   
3 In practice, since an auditor always maintains a questioning mindset, it’s arguable that an auditor would 
never embrace a position of total trust. 
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of skepticism is likely to fluctuate widely because of the ever changing circumstances, 
documents and people encountered during an audit. 
This study examines three aspects of professional skepticism: trait skepticism, 
skeptical judgment, and skeptical action. Trait skepticism is comprised of “… individual 
characteristics that enable auditors to determine when evidence does not “add up,” or traits 
that allow auditors to exercise skeptical judgment (Hurrt, Brown-Liburd, Earley, and 
Krishnamoorthy 2013 pp. 50). Skeptical judgment occurs when an auditor recognizes that 
a potential issue may exist and decides that more work is necessary (2013). Lastly, 
skeptical action is the final step where an auditor modifies their behavior based on their 
judgment.      
Relevant Literature on Professional Skepticism 
Nelson (2009) and Hurtt et al. (2013) conduct detailed literature reviews on auditor 
professional skepticism. The Nelson literature review synthesizes the literature and 
proposes a model on skepticism. The Nelson model theorizes that auditor judgments and 
actions are determined by auditor traits, knowledge, incentives and evidential input. Hurtt 
et al. focus on more recent studies and extend Nelson’s model by creating a new category 
of skepticism called antecedents of skeptical action and judgment. The antecedents of 
skeptical action and judgment include auditor characteristics, evidential characteristics, 
client characteristics, and external environment characteristics.  
Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate the models developed in Nelson (2009) and Hurtt 
et al. (2013). With respect to this study, each of the three variables of interest, trait 
skepticism, skeptical judgment and skeptical action, are reflected in both models. Skeptical 
action and judgment are directly identified as key components in both models. An auditor's 
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trait skepticism is reflected in the Nelson model under 'traits' and in the Hurtt et al. model 
under 'auditor characteristics'. The irrelevant information and minor errors utilized in this 
study are consistent with the 'evidential input' component of the Nelson model and in the 
'evidential characteristics' component of the Hurtt et al. model. The following sections 
discuss key elements of these models as that pertain to this study. 
[Insert Figure 1 and 2 here] 
Auditor Knowledge 
An auditor’s inherent knowledge on a topic can play a part in subsequent judgments 
and actions. Research on auditor knowledge (i.e., what Nelson (2009) breaks down into 
frequency knowledge, pattern recognition, and specialization) identifies both positive and 
negative effects of knowledge on professional skepticism. For example, extant research on 
frequency knowledge (i.e., knowledge of the frequency of types of errors) indicates that 
experienced auditors are familiar with error causes and effects, and this knowledge 
increases with experience (Libby 1985; Ashton 1991; Frederick 1990). Similarly, research 
on pattern recognition reveals that greater knowledge of error frequencies helps auditors 
better analyze and respond to unexpected audit findings (Libby 1985; Frederick 1990; 
Trompeter and Wright 2010). Lastly, research on auditor specialization finds that 
experienced auditors are better able to disregard irrelevant data and are better able to make 
connections among related pieces of evidence that might suggest an increased risk of error 
(Brown and Solomon 1990, 1991; Bedard and Bigs 1991; Maletta and Kida 1993; Shelton 
1999; Low 2004; Hammersley 2006). 
 There is also evidence that experience may have a negative effect on professional 
skepticism. For instance, extant research suggests that more experienced auditors are more 
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likely to believe that exceptions noted during audits have reasonable non-error explanations 
than less experienced auditors (Kaplan, Moeckel, and Williams 1992). Such reasoning 
could negatively impact professional skepticism (Koonce 1992). There is evidence that 
specialist auditors are more likely to believe that audit findings have non-error causes and 
assess lower levels of inherent risk compared to non-specialist auditors (Solomon, Shields, 
and Whittington 1999; Taylor 2000; Payne and Ramsay 2005). In other words, research 
indicates that more experienced auditors tend to over rely on client explanations and are at 
risk of assessing an inappropriately low level of risk. Therefore, while auditor knowledge 
may improve an auditor’s ability to handle complexity in an audit, it may lead to auditors 
becoming biased or less skeptical towards their clients.  
Auditor Traits 
Research also finds that certain personal traits influence an auditor’s judgment and 
actions. Research on auditor traits includes non-knowledge related items such as problem 
solving ability, ethical beliefs, and professional skepticism. As expected, extant research 
on problem solving ability finds that higher ability is generally associated with higher 
performance on professional skepticism related tasks (Bonner and Lewis 1990; Libby and 
Tan 1994; Bierstaker and Wright 2001). Literature on ethics or moral reasoning finds 
similar positive results. These studies, which tend to use assessment instruments like the 
Rest (1986) defining issues test (DIT), find that auditors scoring higher in moral 
development tend to be more sensitive to client competence and integrity (Ponemon 1993; 
Ponemon and Gabhart 1993) and are more likely to identify potentially inappropriate client 
activity (Bernardi 1994; Jones, Massey, and Thorne 2003). These findings suggest that 
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auditors who are inherently better at problem solving and more morally developed would 
make more skeptical judgments than other auditors.  
Skepticism Scales 
This study adopts the Hurtt (2010) scale to measure trait skepticism in auditors. The 
Hurtt scale is a relatively recent output from a stream of literature relating to measuring 
skepticism (e.g., Schaub 1996; Rennie, Kopp, and Lemon 2007; Hurtt 2010). An early 
study by Schaub (1996) compares peoples’ scores on a scale measuring peoples’ general 
propensity to be skeptical and a scale measuring auditor trust in their client. The scale 
measuring peoples’ general propensity to be skeptical includes two earlier scales developed 
by Wrightsman (1974) that assess the belief that people are trustworthy and independent. 
Schaub’s comparison reveals no relation between scores on the propensity to be skeptical 
scale and the client-trust scale. Similarly, Rennie et al. (2007) conduct a related analysis 
and find no association between the client trust measure from Schaub (1996), the auditors’ 
recalled trust in their client scale, and the auditors’ general predisposition to trust people 
scale.  
Hurtt (2010) develops and tests a scale that specifically measures auditor 
professional skepticism (i.e., what this study refers to as trait skepticism). Hurtt’s 30-
question scale includes measures of six separate characteristics of skeptics supported by 
philosophy literature that include: suspension of judgment, questioning mind, search for 
knowledge, interpersonal understanding, self-confidence, and self-determination. 
Consistent with the definitions of professional skepticism discussed previously, Hurtt’s 
scale suggests that skeptics keep an open mind, question possible conclusions, and consider 
the possibility that evidence is biased when searching and reviewing evidence.  
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Subsequent studies validate the Hurtt scale (e.g., Fullerton and Durtschi 2005; 
Hurtt, Eining, and Plumlee 2008; Rosman 2011; Popova 2012; Faraq and Elias 2012; 
Quadackers, Groot, and Wright 2009; 2014). For instance, Hurtt et al. (2008) apply the 
Hurtt skepticism scale to a group of auditors to examine how skepticism influences 
assessment of audit evidence and generation of alternative explanations for findings. They 
find that under normal and higher risk audit situations, auditors scoring higher on the 
skepticism scale engage in more skeptical behaviors than those that score low in 
skepticism.  
Fullerton and Durtschi (2005) apply the Hurtt scale to a study examining internal 
auditors and their search for evidence. Their results indicate that internal auditors with 
higher scores on the skepticism scale have a greater desire to search for explanations 
regarding fraud symptoms. In other words, those determined to be more skeptical also have 
a more questioning mindset towards potential fraud issues they encounter in the survey. 
Lastly, in another related study, Quadackers et al. (2009) apply the Hurtt scale to a group 
of Big-4 auditors in the Netherlands to examine the relationship between their scores on 
the Hurtt scale and their subsequent judgments on an analytical procedures task. Similar to 
Fullerton and Durtschi (2005), their results indicate that high scores on the Hurtt scale are 
positively associated with skeptical auditor behaviors (e.g., the desire to perform further 
testing and the generation of alternative explanations).  
In a more recent study, Quadackers et al. (2014) re-examine the Hurtt scale’s 
predictive ability in a comparison with the Rotter Interpersonal Trust scale (RIT; Rotter 
1967).4 The Hurtt scale is a relatively unbiased instrument when compared to the RIT scale 
                                                          
4 The RIT scale measures an individual’s level of trust, thus to apply it to a skepticism setting they used the 
inverse value of a participant’s score on the RIT scale.  
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which emphasizes a lack of trust and therefore tends to be negatively biased against the 
client. Quadackers et al. predict and find, that although high scores on both scales are 
associated with more skeptical auditor judgment, the RIT scale outperforms the Hurtt scale 
in high-risk settings. The results make sense, as intuitively, someone scoring low on trust 
is probably negatively biased against the client and therefore makes relatively more 
skeptical judgments in all situations; low as well as high risk. For purposes of the study, 
the Hurtt scale is used because it is less biased overall and it has been extensively validated 
as a reliable research tool. 
Auditor Incentives 
Incentives, in addition to knowledge and traits, also influence an auditor’s judgment 
and action. Due to the many powerful yet conflicting incentives auditors face on a regular 
basis (e.g., the incentive to retain clients and the incentive to avoid litigation), there are 
abundant studies across the various research methodologies investigating the impact and 
interaction between various auditor incentives. For instance, analytical research on auditor 
incentives focuses on the auditor-client interaction and argues that auditors are biased by 
the types of incentives they encounter in the field (e.g., Nichols and Price 1976; DeAngelo 
1981; Antle 1982, 1984; Fellingham and Newman 1985; Magee and Tseng 1990; Antle 
and Nalebuff 1991; Teoh 1992; Bloomfield 1995; Johnstone, Sutton, and Warfield 2001).  
Archival research examining auditor incentives primarily focuses on how non-audit 
fees influence auditor independence. Although auditor independence is not the same as 
auditor skeptical judgment and action, the three constructs are closely interrelated. For 
instance, the suggestion by an auditor to limit discretionary accruals or to issue a going 
concern statement (two common variables from this subset of audit archival research) 
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suggests they are exercising skeptical judgment and skeptical action. Some studies in this 
subset of archival research find evidence of non-audit fees reducing auditor independence 
(e.g., Frankel, Johnson and Nelson 2002; Larcker and Richardson 2004; Srinidhi and Gul 
2006; Blay, and Geiger 2013; Causholli, Chambers, and Payne 2014), while other studies 
find that non-audit fees have no effect on auditor independence (e.g., DeFond, 
Raghunandan, and Subramanyam 2002; Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew 2003; Chung 
and Kallapur 2003; Ruddock, Taylor, and Taylor 2006). Thus, from an archival standpoint 
there is mixed evidence that non-audit fee incentives influence auditors’ actions. 
Experimental research examining auditor incentives finds that auditors' judgments 
and actions become more skeptical as the risk of litigation or reputation threats increase. 
Experimental research in this area addresses auditor incentives such as client fee pressure 
(e.g., Gramling 1999; Houston 1999; Beeler and Hunton 2002; Asare, Cohen, and 
Trompeter 2005), client retention concerns (e.g., Farmer, Rittenberg, and Trompeter 1987; 
Trompeter 1984; Chang and Hwang 2003; Blay 2005), audit partner compensation (e.g., 
Trompeter 1994), and litigation exposure (e.g., Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Braun 
2001; Houston, Peters, and Pratt 1999; Hwang, and Chang 2010). However, there is some 
evidence that certain incentives may cause auditors to jeopardize their application of 
skepticism. For instance, Gramling (1999) finds that when fee pressure is high auditors are 
more likely to rely on the work of internal auditors as part of their test work. Hackenbrack 
and Nelson (1996) provide evidence that when engagement risk is moderate, auditors 
permit their clients to take aggressive reporting stances. Lastly, Blay (2005) suggests that 
when the risk of losing the client is high, auditors are more likely to recommend issuing a 
clean audit report. 
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In a more recent literature review on skepticism, Hurrt et al. (2013) highlight that 
auditors may lack positive incentives to make skeptical judgments. For instance, Bazerman 
and Tenbrunsel (2011) raise the issue that a firm’s goals and reward incentives for auditors 
could cause staff to sacrifice their level of skepticism to meet short term firm goals. In other 
words, an auditor who is rewarded on results over high quality decisions, may choose the 
more rewarding path of finishing the audit quickly instead of the more appropriate action 
involving additional documentation and/or audit procedures. To address this issue, 
Peecher, Solomon, and Trotman (2013) suggest a shift away from penalty based auditor 
incentives, such as litigation, through the incorporation of more positive incentives.  
Auditor Judgment 
Since judgment is an integral part of every audit, there is an abundance of research 
in this area (see Allen, Hermanson, Kozloski, and Ramsay 2006; Nelson 2009; and Hurrt 
et al. 2013 for more detailed literature reviews). Relevant literature in this area includes 
research on topics such as motivated reasoning (e.g., Wilks 2002; Kadous, Kennedy, and 
Peeacher 2003; Glover, Prawitt, and Wilks 2005; Guiral, Ruiz, and Rodgers 2011), time 
pressure (e.g., McDaniel 1990; Kelley and Margheim 1990; and Braun 2000), belief 
updating (e.g., Ashton and Ashton 1990; McMillan and White 1993; and Bamber, Ramsay, 
and Tubbs 1997), and irrelevant information (e.g., Hackenbrack 1992; Glover 1997; 
Hoffman and Patton 1997; Shelton 1999).  
Motivated Reasoning 
 There is an extensive body of research on motivated reasoning and its influence on 
auditor judgment. In general, the results are consistent with motivated reasoning theory. 
Motivated reasoning theory (see Pyszczynski and Greenberg 1987; Kunda 1990; Lundgren 
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and Prislin 1998) suggests that auditors who are motivated to reach a certain outcome 
process information in a way that ultimately fits that preferred outcome. For instance, 
Wilks (2002) examines audit manager judgments in an experiment manipulating whether 
audit managers are aware of their audit partner’s beliefs prior to or after making their own 
decision. Wilks finds that managers who know their audit partner’s beliefs ahead of time 
tend to be biased towards the partner’s decisions.  
Similarly, Glover et al. (2005) conduct a study examining why auditors sometimes 
over-rely on evidence obtained from weak substantive analytical procedures. To examine 
this issue they conduct an experiment where auditors rate the strength of evidence provided 
by weak analytical procedures performed in relation to whether an account was materially 
misstated. Results of Glover et al. reveal that auditors view evidence that confirms their 
prior beliefs to be more persuasive than evidence differing from prior beliefs.  
More recently, Guiral et al. (2011) investigate whether auditors’ beliefs about 
evidence are influenced by a self-fulfilling prophecy. They examine this issue in a going 
concern opinion case setting, where they have auditors review evidence and rate how much 
it supports their initial beliefs about the client in the case. Results of the experiment show 
that auditors are more sensitive to evidence that supports their initial belief than 
disconfirming evidence. Thus, the overall results indicate that an auditor’s initial belief 
influences their judgment.  
Time Pressure 
Another related stream of literature addresses how time pressure influences auditor 
judgment. Time pressure is an ongoing issue for audit firms as they strive to manage their 
staff in the most efficient way possible in order to maximize billable hours (McDaniel 
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1990). Time pressure is especially important where auditors are required to travel to the 
client's site or complete the bulk of their work onsite. As expected, extant literature 
suggests that time pressure can lead to an increase in efficiency at the cost of audit quality 
(McDaniel 1990; Gramling 1999). Furthermore, time pressure can lead to auditors 
overlooking critical pieces of evidence that might impact audit risk (Braun 2000). Time 
pressure also increases the likelihood that auditors engage in inappropriate time-saving 
behaviors, such as signing-off on procedures before they are fully completed (Kelley and 
Margheim 1990). However, there is also evidence suggesting that time pressure may help 
auditors avoid being distracted by irrelevant information (Glover 1997).  
Belief Updating  
Another stream of research on auditor judgment relates to belief updating. Initial 
research in belief updating relies on the Bayes’ theorem. The Bayes’ theorem suggests that 
auditor beliefs are determined by mathematical probabilities. Unfortunately, there are 
many situations where the Bayes’ theorem failed to predict changes in auditor beliefs. 
These deviations from the theoretical predictions are attributed to auditors failing to 
consider all relevant information (Ashton and Ashton 1988). Consequently, more recent 
research often uses the Hogarth and Einhorn belief revision model (1992), which does not 
assume that individuals will exhaustively consider all relevant information. 
The belief revision model describes how an initial hypothesis (e.g., the accounts 
receivable account balance is misstated) is updated with the receipt of new evidence (see 
Hogarth and Einhorn 1992 for further information on their belief revision model). 
Procedurally, Hogarth and Einhorn’s model fits auditing research well, as auditors 
approach much of their test work with an initial hypothesis, test their hypothesis with 
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various audit procedures, and then reach their final conclusion. Prior research finds that 
changes in auditor beliefs when evaluating evidence are influenced by a recency effect 
where more recent evidence is weighted more strongly than less recent evidence (e.g., 
Ashton and Ashton 1988; Tubbs, Messier, and Knechel 1990; Asare 1992; Krull, Reckers, 
and Wong-on-Wing 1993), evidence presentation mode (e.g., Ashton and Ashton 1990; 
Knechel and Messier 1990), and confirmation bias (e.g., Butt and Campell 1989; McMillan 
and White 1993; Bamber, Ramsay, and Tubbs 1997). 
 Ashton and Ashton (1988) investigate various influences on auditor belief 
updating in an extensive series of five experiments. Specifically, they ask participants to 
assume an initial probability that an account is misstated. They then present different types 
of evidence to the participants, and measure the change in the probability of a misstatement 
from the initial anchor point. Using auditors as participants, they examine the direction of 
evidence (confirming vs. disconfirming), strength of evidence (strong vs. weak), evidence 
type (consistently in the same direction vs. additional evidence in mixed directions), 
evidence order (strong first vs. weak first), and evidence presentation mode (sequential vs. 
simultaneous). Their experiments provide evidence that weak initial anchor points are more 
influenced by confirming evidence than relatively stronger initial anchor points. They also 
find evidence of a recency effect as well as evidence of a dilution effect (i.e., relevant 
information is under-utilized). These findings suggest that the manner in which evidence 
is received, and whether it confirms or disconfirms initial beliefs, has a strong influence on 
auditor judgment.  
Tubbs et al. (1990) conduct four experiments relating to the recency effect on 
auditor belief updating. Their first two experiments manipulate the order of evidence 
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(weaker first vs. stronger first), while the second two focus on mixed evidence cases (both 
positive and negative information presented). Results of their study indicate that consistent 
additional evidence (all positive or all negative) does not lead to a recency effect. However, 
a recency effect can occur when the evidence is mixed (some positive and some negative).  
Asare (1992) examines whether there is a recency effect with respect to going 
concern decisions. Specifically, Asare examines whether the type and order of evidence 
interact with auditors’ sequential processing of evidence in a going-concern setting. 
Asare’s findings are consistent with Ashton and Ashton (1988), and Butt and Campell 
(1989). Specifically, Asare finds in both belief revision and audit report decisions, that 
when auditors assess the going concern of a company, they tend to be biased by a recency 
effect in evidence evaluation. In other words, auditors who last review evidence suggesting 
the company would continue to exist, ultimately issue fewer going concern opinions, 
compared to settings where auditors last review evidence suggesting otherwise. 
Krull et al. (1993) examine whether presentation order (mixed positive and negative 
information) and fraud signals (present or absent) influence decisions. In addition, Krull et 
al. examine whether experience influences decisions in their study. Instead of using 
auditors, they investigate manager reactions in a fraud assessment case. They observe a 
recency effect where the more experienced managers assign a greater weight to the last 
pieces of evidence received. 
Ashton and Ashton (1990) focus on whether evidence presentation mode influences 
auditor judgment. In other words, they examine whether auditors react differently 
depending on whether evidence is presented all at once or one piece at a time in a sequence. 
Building on their initial study above, Ashton and Ashton conduct a study examining how 
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evidence presentation (sequential vs. simultaneous) and evidence type (positive vs. 
negative) impacts auditor belief updating. They find that there are greater changes in 
auditors’ beliefs when evidence is negative. They also find evidence presented sequentially 
leads to greater changes in beliefs than evidence presented simultaneously. They compare 
their findings to non-auditor participants by running similar experiments with business 
executives. Contrary to their findings with auditors, business executives are not influenced 
by positive or negative evidence; nor are they influenced by whether evidence is presented 
sequentially or all at once. Therefore, this study suggests that auditor training may bias the 
way evidence is evaluated. 
Knechel and Messier (1990) also study whether evidence presentation mode 
influences auditor judgment. In an experimental setting, they allow auditors to select which 
additional sources of evidence to review in their analysis and whether to stop at that point 
or to continue reviewing more evidence. Specifically, Knechel and Messier examine how 
an auditor’s search for additional information influences their evaluation of audit evidence. 
They find that when given a choice, auditors chose to focus on the more reliable pieces of 
evidence. Additionally, their results indicate that auditors that stopped earlier in the 
sequential search for evidence tend to have more extreme assessments. Lastly, consistent 
with prior studies (e.g., Ashton and Ashton 1988), they find that auditor beliefs were more 
impacted by negative evidence than positive evidence.  
Butt and Campell (1989) look at evidence type (i.e., positive vs. negative) and how 
auditors approach evidence evaluation. They investigate whether auditors implement an 
earlier version of the belief revision model called the contrast/surprise model (see Einhorn 
and Hogarth 1985) or whether they use a hypothesis testing strategy (i.e., they are 
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confirmation biased) when evaluating a company’s internal control system. Butt and 
Campell find evidence that auditors are not confirmation biased. Their results also indicate 
that auditors do not seek to confirm their initial assessments and are not more influenced 
by evidence supporting their initial belief. Finally, they find evidence of a recency effect 
on auditor decision making which is consistent with earlier studies.  
McMillan and White (1993) look at how the framing of a hypothesis test influences 
auditor skepticism. They are the first to examine how auditors react in error and non-error 
settings. Non-error settings are situations where it is assumed that the error was not 
intentional. Additionally, they also look at how experience and the type of evidence (i.e., 
confirming vs. disconfirming) influence auditors. The results of McMillan and White’s 
study are consistent with prior studies such as Ashton and Ashton where they find that 
auditors are more sensitive to disconfirming evidence. Their results also indicate that where 
there is evidence of a possible confirmation bias, auditors tend to ignore disconfirming 
evidence in the non-error frame. However, their results indicate that auditors are not prone 
to pre-mature conclusions overall. Therefore, the results of this study are consistent with 
previous studies’ findings that auditors are not confirmation biased in their decisions. 
However, subsequent research suggests that auditors may be confirmation biased 
(e.g., Bamber et al. 1997; Brown, Peecher, and Solomon 1999; Montague 2010). For 
instance, Bamber et al. (1997) have a group of auditors examine the likelihood of fraud 
involving inventory and the likelihood of collecting a material accounts receivable balance. 
Results of their analysis indicate that auditors exhibit a confirmation bias in their 
assessments. This suggests that auditors may be biased in certain situations towards their 
initial hypotheses when evaluating audit evidence.  
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In summary, the findings in belief revision studies suggest that auditor evaluation 
of evidence may be dependent on which pieces of evidence they encountered last, the 
presentation of evidence, and their initial biases. 
Irrelevant Information  
The preceding review of belief updating research is an excellent lead-in to the 
stream of literature regarding the influence of irrelevant information, as the two areas are 
closely interrelated. However, please note that this study differs significantly from extant 
research with respect to the source of the audit evidence. Specifically, this study simulates 
use of records containing irrelevant information that are produced directly by the client 
versus the second-hand anecdotal evidence used in previous research. Based on prior 
research suggesting the source of evidence influences auditors’ assessment of risk (Hirst 
1994), the results of the research studies discussed below may not hold in this more 
personal applied context. 
Extant research on literature examining irrelevant information generally finds that 
irrelevant information diminishes the impact of fraud cues on auditor risk assessment 
(Hackenbrack 1992; Glover 1997; Hoffman and Patton 1997; Shelton 1999). More 
specifically, extant literature finds that a dilution effect (Nisbett, Zukier, and Lemley 1981) 
takes place whereby the presence of additional information reduces the impact of the more 
important information on auditor judgments. Furthermore, even prompting people to be 
aware of a possible dilution effect seems to have no impact on preventing the effect from 
occurring (Kemmelmeier 2004). 
Hackenbrack (1992) examines the impact of diagnostic (i.e., relevant) and non-
diagnostic information (i.e., irrelevant information) on auditor decisions in a fraud 
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judgment scenario. Specifically, auditors read through a case study containing background 
information on a company and the authors manipulate whether a fraud occurrence is 
mentioned or not. Then, auditors rate a series of potential fraud indicators on whether they 
would change their initial fraud risk assessment if they had been included in the case. 
Hackenbrack’s results reveal that auditors given relevant and irrelevant information make 
assessments that are less extreme than auditors given only relevant information. This 
finding suggests that irrelevant information has a dilution effect. 
Hoffman and Patton (1997), build on the work of Hackenbrack (1992) by 
examining whether holding auditors accountable for their judgments helps prevent the 
dilution effect. Their study utilizes a group of auditors making fraud risk assessments in 
the presence of relevant and irrelevant information. In order to examine how accountability 
impacts auditor judgments, some participants are required to later justify their answers to 
a group of their superiors. Surprisingly, Hoffman and Patton find the dilution effect still 
occurs whether auditors are held accountable for their judgments or not. However, the 
authors note that auditors in the accountable condition make more conservative judgments 
than those not held accountable.  
Glover (1997) examines whether time pressure and accountability influences the 
effect of irrelevant information on auditors. The study utilizes auditors making risk 
assessments with irrelevant information present or not present. Auditor participants make 
risk assessments regarding the possibility of an account being misstated. Similar to 
Hoffman and Patton (1997), Glover finds that accountability has no impact on the dilution 
effect of irrelevant information. Although, as mentioned earlier under the time pressure 
section, Glover’s results reveal that time pressure reduces but does not eliminate the 
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dilution effect. In other words, when time pressure is present, there is evidence that auditors 
are less swayed by the presence of irrelevant information. 
Lastly, Shelton (1999) builds on the studies mentioned above by examining 
whether experience plays a role in the appearance of the dilution effect. Shelton uses a 
going concern scenario and compares the assessments of the likelihood of a company 
staying in business made by staff auditors to the assessments made by audit managers and 
partners. Shelton’s results indicate that the more experienced auditors were less distracted 
by irrelevant information. 
Overall, prior research suggests that the presence of irrelevant information impacts 
an auditor’s judgment. However, all previous studies examine irrelevant information in 
audit settings utilizing irrelevant information external to the records being reviewed. This 
study builds on these prior studies by examining the impact of irrelevant information on 
skeptical judgements and actions - within the context of a client generated record. The more 
applied context in this study adds a more personal and possibly a more relevant and/or 
realistic experience to the research setting. Based on prior research suggesting the source 
of evidence influences auditors’ assessment of risk (Hirst 1994), the results of the research 
studies discussed above may not hold in this more personal applied context. 
Audit Evidence Characteristics 
The “evidential inputs” component of Nelson’s model (2009) is particularly 
relevant to this study’s research questions. The stream of research on evidential inputs is 
extended in the Hurtt et al. (2013) model and literature review under the category of audit 
evidence characteristics. Extant recent research on evidential characteristics and auditor 
skepticism looks at confirming vs. disconfirming evidence (e.g., Fukukawa and Mock 
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2011; Trompeter and Wright 2012) and the source of evidence (e.g., Beaulieu 2001; 
Kizirian, Mayhew, and Sneathen Jr. 2005; Harding and Trotman 2011).  
Confirming vs. Disconfirming Evidence 
Early studies examining confirming vs. disconfirming evidence are discussed in the 
belief updating section above (e.g., Ashton and Ashton 1988; 1990). Typically, these 
studies find that auditors tend to focus more on disconfirming evidence (e.g., Knechel and 
Messier 1990). Disconfirming evidence typically takes the form of negative evidence or 
evidence suggesting a misstatement is more likely (disconfirming an initial belief that 
views the client positively or that there is no misstatement). However, positive evidence 
would be disconfirming if the auditor’s initial belief is a negative assessment of the client.  
More recent studies (e.g., Fukukawa and Mock 2011; Trompeter and Wright 2012) 
focus on how evidence influences fraud related judgments in non-belief updating settings. 
Fukukawa and Mock (2011) examine how positive or negative assertion framing impacts 
the assessment of risk in a trade accounts receivable case. They also observe whether an 
auditor’s risk assessment is influenced by a belief based or probability based approach to 
assertion testing. Results of their study indicate that auditors make similar assessments 
regardless of approach when evaluating positive assertions. However, when evaluating 
negative assertions, they find that auditors are less likely to confirm management’s 
assertions.  
Similarly, Trompeter and Wright (2012) examine how auditor risk assessments 
change based on third party information relating to client business performance. 
Specifically, they examine how auditors react to three critical pieces of evidence in a fraud 
setting: client provided evidence on the financial statement process, client provided 
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evidence on meeting their performance objectives, and externally obtained evidence on the 
client meeting their performance objectives. They find that auditor fraud risk assessments 
are most influenced by external evidence when the external evidence is inconsistent with 
client provided evidence.  
The above findings suggest that participants may react more strongly in situations 
where irrelevant information or minor errors are present (since both manipulations could 
be perceived as negative). In other words, auditors with prior negative experiences dealing 
with client provided documents containing irrelevant information or minor errors may react 
in a more skeptical manner than auditors without prior negative experiences with such 
documents.  
Source of Evidence  
 Auditing standards (e.g., SAS 99; AICPA 2002) require auditors to adjust their 
level of skepticism based on evidence obtained. Therefore, the source of evidence is a 
critical consideration in the evaluation of audit evidence. Prior research finds auditors place 
greater trust in evidence received from external sources (i.e., third parties; Hirst 1994). 
Harding and Trotman (2011) examine how evidence source influences auditor fraud risk 
assessments in brainstorming sessions. They manipulate whether risk assessments come 
from the auditor partner, from client management, or none were included. Their analysis 
shows that auditors are most skeptical of assessments from the client - and respond by 
making more skeptical judgments.  
Other studies in this stream of research examine how management’s integrity 
influences auditor evaluation of evidence (e.g., Beaulieu 2001; Kizirian et al. 2005). 
Consistent with prior research, the results show that auditors tend to collect more evidence 
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from external sources when client management is viewed as being of low integrity. The 
above findings suggest that auditors may react more skeptically in situations where 
documents are provided by the client. In other words, when auditors are asked to make 
assessments about a document provided by a client, they may be predisposed to be more 
skeptical regardless of the audit evidence provided in the case. 
Errors in Audit Evidence 
 Errors in audit evidence are discussed above in several different research streams. 
For example, errors in audit evidence are included as part of auditor knowledge of errors 
(e.g., Libby 1985; Ashton 1991) and belief updating (e.g., Ashton and Ashton 1988; 
Fukuwa and Mock 2011). Other streams of research examine the characteristics of errors 
(e.g., Kreutzfeldt and Wallace 1986; Maletta and Wright 1996; Chan, Lin, and Mo 2003) 
and auditor performance when using sampling to detect errors (e.g., Wurst, Neter, and 
Godfrey 1991; Allen and Elder 2005; Durney, Elder, and Glover 2014).  
Studies examining errors in the context of audit sampling typically focus on finding 
ways to improve auditor sampling techniques to better detect errors. For example, 
examining new techniques, such as the use of rectification (Wurst et al. 1991) or modified 
sieve sampling (Hoogduin, Hall, and Tsay 2010). In addition, other studies find that 
auditors tend to fail to project errors found in their sampling results to the larger population 
(e.g., Burgstahler and Jiambalvo 1986; Elder and Allen 1998; Allen and Elder 2005). More 
recently, Durney et al. (2014) utilize historical audit firm data to identify the distribution, 
frequencies and magnitudes of errors found in audits. They find a decline in post-SOX 
error occurrence rates and increased use of larger sample sizes. Their findings suggest that 
audit firms’ actions are more skeptical or focused on providing higher quality audits.  
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 Numerous early studies examine the characteristics and causes of audit errors (e.g., 
Johnson, Leitch, and Neter 1981; Ham, Losell, and Smieliauskas 1985; Kreutzfeldt and 
Wallace 1986). Hylas and Ashton (1982) examine 281 financial statement errors requiring 
audit adjustments on 152 audits and find that most errors are unintentionally caused from 
inexperienced client employees. They also find that most errors are caught from analytical 
procedures and discussions with the client. Other studies in this area find that error 
characteristics differ between cultures (e.g., errors are more prevalent and larger in 
individualistic cultures; Chan et al. 2003) and more heavily regulated industries have less 
errors (Maletta and Wright 1996).  
More relevant to this study is research identifying the common errors auditors 
encounter within specific types of accounts. Kreutzfeldt and Wallace (1986) identify the 
types, frequencies, and size of errors in a dataset of 260 audit engagements across the 13 
largest offices of Arthur Anderson & Co. They examine errors in accounts receivable, 
inventory, fixed assets, accounts payable, and accrued liabilities. They find that errors 
typically fall into one of the following categories: omission errors, duplication errors, 
clerical errors, cutoff errors, judgment errors, and incorrect application of GAAP errors.   
 This study utilizes minor omission errors, duplication errors, clerical errors, and 
cutoff errors. Moreover, in this study, minor errors are immaterial to the related account 
balance as well as the overall financial results and do not appear to be intentional or 
deceptive. However, in practice, minor errors may accumulate to a level (or form a pattern) 
that triggers an adjustment in an auditor's level of skepticism. Therefore, this study seeks 
to examine the influence of minor errors on an auditor's application of professional 
skepticism.  
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III. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Irrelevant Information 
According to the PCAOB, each individual auditor is responsible for appropriately 
applying professional skepticism throughout the audit, including in the areas of identifying 
and assessing the risk of account misstatements, and in the evaluation of audit evidence 
(PCAOB 2012). Furthermore, the PCAOB states the objective of the auditor is to plan and 
perform the audit to obtain appropriate audit evidence that is sufficient to support the 
opinion expressed in the audit report (AS 15; 2010). As previously mentioned, this study 
focuses on audit evidence. Irrelevant evidence is not something that, by itself, should raise 
any sort of red flag to an auditor. By definition, this is evidence that is not relevant to the 
decision at hand. Therefore, one might reason that the presence of irrelevant information 
should have no impact on an auditor’s assessment of the sufficiency (i.e., the quantity) and 
appropriateness (i.e., the quality) of audit evidence obtained or to be obtained.  
However, extant research suggests that the presence of irrelevant information does 
have an effect on auditors. Specifically, extant literature on irrelevant information suggests 
that it can lead to a dilution effect where the strength of subsequent auditor decisions is 
reduced as compared to situations where there is no irrelevant information (e.g., 
Hackenbrack 1992; Hoffman and Patton 1997). This study differs from prior studies, which 
used second-hand anecdotal information. Instead, this study utilizes records produced 
directly by the client (and therefore experienced first-hand by the auditor). Therefore, there 
may be differences in the way irrelevant information affects auditor decisions in this 
setting. 
Process Accountability Theory and Epistemic Motivation  
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Recent research on process accountability theory and epistemic motivation 
suggests both are related to higher quality auditor judgments (e.g., Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, 
Peytcheva, and Wright 2013). Process accountability is the expectation of having to justify 
your decision to others (Siegel-Jacobs and Yates 1996; Tetlock 1983). Given the 
potentially harmful professional sanctions, plus the devastating costs associated with audit 
failure, much auditor attention is directed towards avoiding circumstances involving 
inadequate audit evidence and documentation. Therefore, the effects of accountability 
could be especially evident for auditors, as they are subject to the several layers of 
accountability (i.e., several layers of people reviewing their work) in an audit firm. For 
instance, each workpaper prepared by a staff auditor is reviewed by more senior staff 
auditors, senior auditors, supervisors or managers, directors, and sometimes even partners 
and regulators, such as the PCAOB. Epistemic motivation is the desire to fully understand 
the problem at hand (Scholten, Van Knippenberg, Nijstad, and Dreu 2007; Dreu and 
Carnevale 2003; Kruglanski 1989). In an audit context, epistemic motivation could result 
in doing additional work or consulting with an expert to gain additional comfort around an 
issue. 
Epistemic motivation and process accountability working in tandem or separately 
could cause an auditor to exert extra audit effort that may potentially rise to the level of 
unnecessary auditing. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Hoffman and Patton 1997), 
when taking process accountability and epistemic motivation into account, auditors 
encountering dirty client records with irrelevant information may perform additional 
procedures (i.e., approach those documents with a more skeptical mindset) than they 
otherwise would with clean records with no irrelevant information. Therefore, in my first 
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set of hypotheses below, I predict that auditors will have a tendency to make more skeptical 
judgments and take more skeptical action when they encounter documents containing 
irrelevant information. This discussion leads us to my first set of hypotheses: 
H1a: Auditors presented with dirty records containing irrelevant information will 
assess a greater likelihood of an account misstatement than auditors presented with 
clean records. 
H1b: Auditors presented with dirty records containing irrelevant information will 
increase their sample size more than auditors presented with clean records. 
Minor Errors 
As with irrelevant information, at first glance, the presence of minor errors should 
have no impact on an auditor’s assessment of the sufficiency (the quantity) and 
appropriateness (the quality) of audit evidence. The presence of minor errors should have 
no impact on the quality of the overall evidence obtained (assuming the errors can be 
explained or fixed easily) and should not impact the overall quantity. However, auditors 
are held accountable for their decisions by numerous parties (e.g., more senior auditors, 
managers, directors, and partners). Therefore, they tend to make more conservative 
judgments when encountering potential risks (e.g., Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Blay 
2005; see the incentives discussion above for further detail). Accordingly, the presence of 
minor errors could potentially motivate auditors to question the overall credibility of the 
client documents and subsequently lead to over auditing. Thus, I predict in my second set 
of hypotheses that auditors encountering minor errors in client provided records would seek 
out explanations behind those errors and consequently make more skeptical judgments and 
take more skeptical action. This discussion leads to my second set of hypotheses: 
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H2a: Auditors presented with dirty records containing minor errors will assess a 
greater likelihood of an account misstatement than auditors presented with clean 
records. 
H2b: Auditors presented with dirty records containing minor errors will increase 
their sample size more than auditors presented with clean records. 
The Interaction between Irrelevant Information and Minor Errors 
 When taking both irrelevant information and minor errors into account, I predict 
that the additional effort necessary to interpret the dirty records will make the minor errors 
less salient and cause auditors to overlook them. This prediction is consistent with extant 
skepticism research suggesting that in the presence of complex clients there is the potential 
for auditors to become overwhelmed in information, potentially leading to a break down 
in skepticism (Hurtt et al. 2013). Furthermore, the literature on irrelevant information and 
belief updating discussed earlier (e.g., Ashton and Ashton 1988; Hackenbrack 1992) 
suggests that a dilution effect can occur when information is presented simultaneously (all 
at once). Such a dilution effect may cause auditors to make less skeptical judgments. Thus, 
I predict in my third set of hypotheses that skepticism will be lower when irrelevant 
information and minor errors are present as compared to when just one manipulation is 
present (see Figure 3 below). This discussion leads us to the following hypotheses: 
H3a: Auditors presented with dirty records containing irrelevant information and 
minor errors will assess a greater likelihood of an account misstatement than 
auditors presented with clean records, but will assess a lower likelihood than 
participants presented with just irrelevant information or just minor errors. 
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H3b: Auditors presented with dirty records containing irrelevant information and 
minor errors will select larger additional sample sizes than auditors presented with 
clean records, but lower additional sample sizes than auditors presented with only 
irrelevant information or minor errors. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
Skepticism Analysis 
As noted previously, numerous studies have worked to create scales to measure a 
person’s inherent level of skepticism (e.g., Schwaub 1996; Rennie et al. 2007; Hurtt 2010). 
Extant literature has also examined whether scores on skepticism scales are related to 
skeptical judgments (e.g., Fullerton and Durtschi 2005; Hurtt et al. 2008; Rosman 2011; 
Quadackers et al. 2014). Consistent with prior studies, I intend to measure each 
participant's level of skepticism to examine whether there is a relation between the 
participant's inherent level of skepticism (trait skepticism) and their skeptical judgments in 
this experiment. As noted earlier in the Skepticism Scales section, the Hurtt scale is most 
closely related to the continuum definition of skepticism and has been validated in several 
additional studies. Therefore, The Hurtt scale is used to measure participant skepticism in 
this study. I predict, consistent with prior studies, that auditors who score higher on the 
skepticism scale will make more skeptical judgments regardless of the circumstances. This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
H4a: Auditors with higher level of trait skepticism will make larger assessments of 
the likelihood of account misstatement. 
H4b: Auditors with higher level of trait skepticism will select larger sample sizes. 
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IV. METHOD 
Design and Participants 
This study employs a 2 x 2 between-subjects design manipulating the presence of 
irrelevant information in the client documents (i.e., present vs. absent) and whether there 
are minor errors in the client documents (i.e., no errors vs. errors). This study also measures 
each participant’s trait skepticism and examines whether it influences auditor skeptical 
judgments or actions. The two primary dependent variables in this study are the increase 
in the participant’s beliefs about account misstatement risk (i.e., a skeptical judgment) and 
the increase in sample size (i.e., a skeptical action). 
Accountants with public accounting experience were recruited through Qualtrics 
Panel as participants in this study.5 Qualtrics Panel is part of a larger web-based survey 
development application called Qualtrics. Qualtrics allows individuals to create surveys 
and collect participant responses. Qualtrics Panel offers participant recruiting services for 
researchers. A total of 100 accountants completed the instrument. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of four conditions. In addition to the Control Condition (with no 
irrelevant information or minor errors) the other treatments consisted of: Treatment 1 with 
no irrelevant information but minor errors are present; Treatment 2 with irrelevant 
information and no minor errors; and Treatment 3 containing both irrelevant information 
and minor errors. 
Tasks and Procedures 
Study participants were sent a link through Qualtrics Panel that provided a link to 
the survey instrument.6 As shown in Appendix A, the first screen of the online instrument 
                                                          
5 This study was approved by the Internal Review Board at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
6 The instrument in this study was pilot tested with 40 auditing students at a large southeastern university. 
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contained an information sheet describing the experiment and the voluntary nature of 
participating.7 The next four screens of the instrument contained four multiple choice 
screening questions designed to remove potential participants lacking accounting 
experience and auditing knowledge (see Screens 2-5 in Appendix A). The first two 
questions verified that participants had public accounting knowledge and experience. The 
first question asked “How would you describe your primary area of expertise?” If 
participants did not select “accounting/auditing” then they were removed from the survey. 
The second question asked “Do you have public accounting experience?” In order to 
proceed they had to answer “yes.”  
Questions 3 and 4 verified participants had auditing knowledge. The third question 
asked “On an audit engagement, if an account is described as high risk then which of the 
following could take place?” To get this question right they had to select the answer labeled 
“It’s highly likely the account is misstated.” The last question asked “On an audit 
engagement, if an account is described as high risk, typically how will auditors respond 
when selecting a sample of items to test?” The correct answer for this question was “They 
will select a large sample of items to test.” Participants had to get all four screening 
questions correct in order to proceed with the study. 
Participants who passed the screening questions were then presented with a 
hypothetical case scenario (see Screen 6 in Appendix A). The case scenario had 
participants assume the role of a staff auditor performing the accounts receivable portion 
of an audit of a hypothetical company called Sprandel, Inc., a mid-sized public company 
                                                          
7 Although participation was voluntary and subjects could quit at any time, Qualtrics would only 
compensate them for their participation if they completed the full instrument. 
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specializing in the production of plastic shaped bottles.8 The case scenario indicated that 
the audit team assessed the inherent risk for the account as high and the control risk for the 
account as low. Thus, the overall risk for the account was described as moderate.  
Participants were then given the task of assessing the likelihood of account 
misstatement and determining the appropriate sample size. In order to provide a baseline 
for assessing the likelihood of account misstatement, participants were informed that their 
initial estimate of the account being misstated was 20 percent and in prior years the audit 
team selected 10 items to test. Before proceeding to the review of audit evidence, 
participants were required to pass a short quiz to verify they were aware of the initial risk 
assessment and prior sample size (see Screen 7 in Appendix A). The first quiz question 
asked them “What was your initial estimate of the likelihood of accounts receivable being 
misstated?” The second question asked them “In prior years, how many items did your firm 
select to sample?” In order to proceed participants had to select “20 percent” for the first 
question and “10 items” for the second question. Unlike the earlier screening questions, 
participants were allowed multiple attempts at selecting the correct answer.  
The next screen (see Screen 8 in Appendix A) contained a task reminder to ensure 
participants knew their task when reviewing the audit evidence. After that the audit 
evidence screen was presented next (see Screen 9 in Appendix A). Participants were 
required to view the audit evidence screen for at least 20 seconds, although the average 
time participants viewed this screen across all four treatments was 60 seconds. Once 
finished viewing the audit evidence, participants were presented with the two dependent 
variable questions, followed by a series of debriefing questions.  
                                                          
8 The hypothetical company Sprandel, Inc., is adapted from a teaching case by Andiola, Lambert, and 
Lynch (2017). 
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Independent Variables 
 The first independent variable was the presence of irrelevant information. As shown 
in Appendix A (see Screen 9), this variable was manipulated at two levels (irrelevant 
information present vs. not present). Participants assigned to the irrelevant information 
absent condition were presented with a client document that had no irrelevant information. 
This condition only showed the customer name, invoice number, invoice date, and invoice 
amount. Alternatively, participants assigned to the irrelevant information present condition 
were presented with a document that contained irrelevant information in the form of 
unnecessary columns of information. The unnecessary columns contained information on 
the state the customer is located in, the phone number of the customer, the skew code of 
the items sold, and the name and number of items sold.9 
 The second independent variable examined the presence of minor errors. As shown 
in Appendix A (see Screen 9), this variable was also manipulated at two levels (i.e., minor 
errors present vs. minor errors absent). 10 In the minor errors present condition, participants 
were presented with client provided audit evidence that contained five minor errors: the 
total account balance did not tie to the balance sheet, there were minor typographical errors, 
and there were blank spaces indicating that pieces of the information were potentially 
missing. Participants assigned to the minor errors absent condition were presented with a 
client document that was free from errors: the total account balance tied to the balance 
sheet, there were no minor typographical errors in the information, and the information was 
complete.  
                                                          
9 Three auditors with public accounting experience verified that the irrelevant information used in this 
study accurately depicts examples of irrelevant information that auditors encounter in practice. 
10 In order to determine the appropriate number and type of errors, this instrument was pilot tested with 40 
undergraduate auditing students at a large southeastern university. 
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The final independent variable was a measured variable of each participant’s trait 
skepticism. At the end of the experiment, participants completed the Hurtt (2010) 30 item 
skepticism scale (see Screens 16-18 of Appendix A). The scale measures skepticism using 
questions such as “I often accept other people’s explanations without further thought” or 
“I am confident in my abilities.” Responses for each item were captured on a seven point 
Likert scale with 1 representing “strongly disagree” and 7 representing “strongly agree.” 
Dependent Variables 
 There are two primary dependent variables in this study (see Screen 10 in Appendix 
A). The first dependent variable measured the participant’s beliefs about account 
misstatement risk after encountering a clean versus a dirty client document. Consistent with 
prior studies mentioned earlier in the belief updating section (e.g., Ashton and Ashton 
1988), participants were given an initial estimate in the case description that the likelihood 
of the account being misstated was 20 percent. Subsequently, after being presented with 
audit evidence that varied across participants according to treatment, participants rated 
their beliefs about the likelihood of the account being misstated on a scale ranging from 0 
percent to 100 percent.  
 The second dependent variable was the participant’s choice of sample size after 
encountering a clean vs a dirty client document. The initial sample size recommended to 
participants was 10 client records based on prior experience with the client. However, after 
reviewing the dirty document, participants were given the opportunity to choose any 
sample size between 0 to 30 client records (ranging from 0 percent to 100 percent of the 
items displayed). 
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Post-Experimental Questionnaire 
 After answering the dependent variable questions, participants completed a post-
experimental questionnaire. As shown in Appendix A (see Screens 11-19), the post-
experimental questionnaire included one manipulation check question, attention check 
questions, debriefing items, demographic questions, and the scale measuring skepticism. 
The manipulation check question verified errors were present and asked “Agree or 
Disagree – The file sent by the client appeared to contain potential errors.” Participants 
responded on a seven point Likert scale with 1 representing “strongly disagree” and 7 
representing “strongly agree.” Since the presence of irrelevant information is something 
participants may not be consciously aware of, there were no manipulation check question 
relating to irrelevant information.   
Attention check questions were added to the case to verify participants were still 
actively reading each question. The first attention check question was presented after the 
manipulation check questions and asked “complete this sentence: The balance sheet 
equation is Assets = Liabilities + _____.” It was presented as a multiple choice question 
and the correct answer was “Stockholders’ Equity.” The second attention check question 
was included as part of the Hurtt (2010) skepticism scale. Instead of asking participants to 
rate how closely a statement described themselves, this second attention check question 
asked participants to “please select strongly disagree for this item.” This verified they were 
actively reading the scale items and not just randomly selecting answers. Participants who 
answered either of these questions incorrectly were removed from the study by Qualtrics 
Panel. 
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The debriefing questions examined participant perceptions, experiences, and 
beliefs about dirty documents. The first debriefing question used a seven point Likert scale 
with 1 representing “strongly disagree” and 7 representing “strongly agree” and asked 
“Agree or Disagree – Your review of the file increased you confidence in the client’s 
competence.” The purpose of this question was to assess participant’s beliefs about client 
competence based on how they felt about the audit evidence provided. The second 
debriefing question used a seven point Likert scale with 1 representing “never” and 7 
representing “all the time” and asked “How often do you or your audit team encounter 
messy or dirty audit files from clients?” The next question built on the second question by 
providing participants with an open ended question asking “Please briefly describe your 
most noteworthy experience receiving messy/dirty files from clients.”  
The next two questions examined how participants felt they are influenced by dirty 
documents captured at the first and third person level. The first question captured responses 
at the first person level and asked “Agree or Disagree – Client files that are messy/dirty 
impact my application of professional skepticism.” While the second question addressed 
the third person level and asked “Agree or Disagree – Messy/dirty documents provided by 
the client can influence the application of professional skepticism by other members of my 
audit team.” The purpose of the questions relating to the first and third person perspectives 
was to identify whether a social desirability bias was present. 
The demographic and experience questions captured age, years of public 
accounting and other professional experience, and gender. In addition, participants were 
asked more specifically “What types of public accounting firms have you worked for?” 
and “Do you have any professional certifications?” Both questions provided several 
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potential answers in a multiple choice format and allowed participants to select more than 
one answer.  
V. RESULTS 
Demographics and Covariates 
 Qualtrics rejected prospective participants that failed the screening and attention 
check questions. A total of 100 accountants subsequently completed the experimental 
survey questionnaire. Three participants were later removed for giving nonsensical 
answers to the main dependent variables questions (e.g., they said they thought there was 
a 100 percent likelihood the account was misstated, but then they selected to sample zero 
items). Therefore, 97 accountants were ultimately included in the analysis. 
Table 1 summarizes the demographic information of the remaining 97 participants. 
As shown in Table 1, 32 percent of participants fell within the age range of 21 to 30, 26 
percent within the age range of 31 to 40, 16 percent fell within the range of 41 to 50, and 
27 percent were over 50 years old. The majority of participants spoke English as a first 
language (93 percent). There was a fairly even number of male and female participants 
with slightly more male participants (56 percent). The average years of public accounting 
experience was 9.60 years, and the average years of other professional experience was 8.58 
years. The most common professional certification was Certified Public Accountant (71 
percent). Lastly, 27 percent had experience working for the Big 4/International (or 
equivalent at the time) accounting firms, 26 percent had experience working for second tier 
accounting firms, 28 percent had experience working for regional accounting firms, and 47 
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percent had experience working for local accounting firms.11 When these demographic 
variables were added to the analysis as covariates, there was no evidence that the variables 
were significant. Therefore, the demographic variables were not included as covariates in 
subsequent analyses. 
 To determine whether random assignment to treatments had been achieved, the 
presence of irrelevant information and the presence of minor errors were included as 
independent variables in a MANOVA model, with the demographic variables mentioned 
above included as dependent variables. A lack of significance was found for all 
demographic variables. This finding provides some evidence that randomization was 
achieved. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Debriefing Questions 
 As part of the post-experimental questionnaire participants answered a series of 
debriefing questions designed to gauge how relevant dirty documents are in auditing. A 
Likert scale was used to assign a value to the responses. As shown in Table 2, the first 
question asked whether the participant’s review of the file increased their confidence in the 
client’s competence. The mean response for treatments containing errors was 2.52, while 
the mean responses for treatments not containing errors was 4.04. The difference between 
these values is significant (p < 0.001) suggesting that the presence of minor errors had a 
significant impact on participant perception of client competence. The mean for treatments 
containing irrelevant information was 3.40, and the mean for conditions without irrelevant 
information was 3.14. The differences between these values was insignificant (p > 0.10), 
                                                          
11 Since participants could select more than one answer to the questions relating to work experience and 
certifications, the responses exceed 100 percent. 
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thus there were no significant differences between treatments containing irrelevant 
information or not containing irrelevant information.  
The second question asked how often the participant or their audit teams 
encountered messy or dirty audit files. The mean response was a 4.24 where a 4.0 
represented “occasionally” and a 5.0 represented “frequently.” The third and fourth 
questions asked participants to agree or disagree with the statement that messy or dirty 
audit files influence their application of professional skepticism and the skepticism of other 
members of their audit team. The mean responses for their professional skepticism was a 
5.36, and for the professional skepticism of their teammates the mean was a 5.22. The 
responses to questions one, three, and four fell on a scale where 4.0 represented a neutral 
response.  
The last question asked how much time on average participants spent on client sites 
cleaning up dirty or messy documents. This question was answered on a scale that included 
a sliding bar that allowed participants to select any number between 0 and 100 percent. The 
mean response was 32 percent, which suggests that cleaning up dirty or messy documents 
fills a significant amount of audit staff time. In summary, the results of these questions 
provide support for the motivation of this study. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 Lastly, participants were asked in an open ended question to describe their most 
noteworthy experience with messy or dirty files. Thirty-four participants responded to this 
question (See Appendix B for a list of all the responses). Five of the responses specifically 
contained the words irrelevant information and or minor/major errors. All 34 responses 
described an experience where the files contained an error(s) or contained irrelevant 
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information. The responses to the open ended question suggest that fixing or addressing 
minor errors and working with irrelevant information is an on-going issue for auditors and 
lends further motivation to this study.  
Manipulation Check Question 
 The manipulation check question addressed the presence of errors using seven point 
Likert response scales with one representing “strongly disagree” and seven representing 
“strongly agree.” The manipulation check question asked participants “Agree or Disagree 
– The file sent by the client appeared to contain potential errors.” The mean response for 
treatments containing errors was 5.82, and for treatments containing no errors the mean 
was 3.98. There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) between conditions with and 
without errors consistent with a successful manipulation of the presence of errors. The 3.98 
overall mean for conditions with no errors was probably a result of using the “agree or 
disagree” type Likert scale for responses. Participants who were unsure of whether errors 
were present or not may have selected a neutral response of 4 representing “neither agree 
nor disagree” to be safe. Additionally, the mean response for treatments containing 
irrelevant information was 4.93, and the mean response for treatments without irrelevant 
information was 4.92. There was no significant difference (p > 0.10) between these 
treatments providing evidence that the presence of irrelevant information did not influence 
participant’s perception of errors being present. Overall, the results of this question 
indicates that the manipulation of the presence of minor errors was successful. 
Test of Hypotheses  
 The two primary dependent variables are the increase in the likelihood of account 
misstatement risk and the increase in sample size. The likelihood of account misstatement 
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was captured on a scale from 0 percent to 100 percent. Then the increase in likelihood of 
account misstatement was calculated by subtracting the initial likelihood of misstatement 
(20 percent) from each participant’s response. The sample size was captured on a scale 
ranging from 0 items to 30 items. To calculate the increase in sample size, the initial sample 
size (10 items) was subtracted from each participant’s response. Descriptive statistics are 
summarized in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Tests of Hypothesis 1a and 1b 
To investigate how auditors as a whole are influenced by dirty documents, 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 were tested using a multivariate analysis of variance (general linear 
model).12 The results are reported in Table 4 and shown in Figure 4 and 5. H1 examines 
the main effect of irrelevant information on the increase in likelihood of account 
misstatement and the increase in sample size. H1a predicts that auditors will assess a 
greater likelihood of an account misstatement when they encounter irrelevant information. 
Similarly, H1b predicts that auditors will select a larger sample size when they encounter 
irrelevant information. As shown in Table 4, the main effect for irrelevant information is 
insignificant for the increase in account misstatement likelihood (F(1, 93) = 2.263, p > 
0.10) and significant for increase in sample size (F(1, 93) = 4.969, p < 0.05). These findings 
fail to provide evidence in support of H1a, but find evidence in support of H1b. The change 
in sample size suggests that irrelevant information may be perceived suspiciously and 
while the risk assessment does not immediately increase, auditors cover themselves by 
increasing the sample size.    
                                                          
12 Experience was examined as a co-variate in this model, but was not significant. 
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Tests of Hypothesis 2a and 2b 
 Hypothesis 2 examines the main effect of minor errors on the increase in likelihood 
of account misstatement and the increase in sample size. H2a predicts that when minor 
errors are present, auditors will assess a greater likelihood of an account misstatement. 
Similarly, H2b predicts that when minor errors are present auditors will increase their 
sample size. As shown in Table 4, the main effect for minor errors is significant for increase 
in account misstatement ((F(1, 93) = 5.332, p < 0.05) and increase in sample size (F(1, 93) 
= 4.969, p < 0.05). Consistent with H2a and H2b, these findings provide evidence that the 
presence of minor errors significantly influences auditor judgment regarding the likelihood 
of account misstatement and the audit sample size. 
Tests of Hypothesis 3a and 3b 
 Hypothesis 3 examines the interaction between the presence of irrelevant 
information and the presence of minor errors. Specifically, H3a and H3b predict that when 
both manipulations are present then a dilution effect will occur where auditors react less 
strongly than they would if only one manipulation was present. As shown in Table 4, the 
interaction between irrelevant information and minor errors was insignificant for both the 
increase in account misstatement likelihood (F(1, 93) = 0.032, p > 0.10) and for increase 
in sample size (F(1, 93) = 0.499, p > 0.10). Thus, these results find no evidence of an 
interaction between the presence of irrelevant information and the presence of minor errors. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
To further analyze the main effects found above, a Games-Howell post hoc test was 
conducted. A Games-Howell post hoc test was used after a Levene’s test for homogeneity 
was found to be significant. Therefore, the assumption of equal variances could not be 
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assumed. Results of the Games’ Howell post hoc test reveal that the Control condition 
(where neither irrelevant information nor minor errors were present) and Treatment 3 
(where both irrelevant information and minor errors were present) were significant for both 
change in misstatement amount (p < 0.10) and change in number of items (p < 0.05). 
Consistent with the results above, these findings suggest that both irrelevant information 
and minor errors influence auditor judgments and actions. 
Tests of Hypothesis 4a and 4b 
Hypothesis 4 examines whether auditors with higher levels of trait skepticism make 
more skeptical judgments and take more skeptical action. H4a predicts that auditors with 
higher levels of trait skepticism will make larger assessments of the likelihood of the 
account being misstated than those with lower levels of skepticism. Similarly, H4b predicts 
that auditors with higher levels of trait skepticism will select larger sample sizes. Consistent 
with auditors tested in Hurtt (2010), the overall average skepticism score for participants 
in Experiment 1 was 75.58 (see Table 5 for details on responses to the Hurtt scale).13  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
In addition, the consistency of trait skepticism scores was tested across the four 
treatment conditions using a one-way ANOVA and no significant differences were noted 
(p > 0.10). This finding suggests that the average trait skepticism score of participants was 
constant across the four conditions and that viewing different manipulations did not 
inadvertently bias skepticism scale scores. To investigate H4a and H4b, a multivariate 
analysis of variance (general linear model) was used. As shown in Table 6, trait skepticism 
did not have a significant impact (p > 0.10) on the likelihood of misstatement or sample 
                                                          
13 Auditors surveyed in Hurtt (2010) scored a 75 on one occasion and a 77 on another occasion. 
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size. There was also no interaction between trait skepticism and the presence of irrelevant 
information or the presence of minor errors. Thus, H4a and H4b were not supported. 
Therefore, inconsistent with prior trait skepticism studies (e.g., Hurtt et al. 2008; Rosman 
2011; Quadackers et al. 2014) the results do not provide evidence that the auditors’ trait 
skepticism influenced their decisions in the experiment. Perhaps the similar training 
auditors receive is responsible for the lack of difference between high and low skeptics. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
[Insert Figure 4 and 5 here] 
Supplemental Analysis  
 In order to examine whether participant beliefs about client competency influenced 
their skeptical judgment and skeptical action, a supplemental mediation analysis was 
conducted using the Hayes (2012) PROCESS tool in SPSS. Table 7 and Figure 6 show the 
results simple mediation model tests (PROCESS Model 4). As shown in Table 7 four 
mediation models were tested to see if participant beliefs about client competency mediated 
the relationship between irrelevant information and minor errors and the dependent 
variables misstatement likelihood and sample size. As shown in Table 7 Panel B and in 
Figure 6, client competency was found to fully mediate the association between minor 
errors and misstatement likelihood (coeffminor errors = -1.52, p = 0.000 and coeffclient competency 
= -5.72, p = 0.004). This suggests that participant judgments about the likelihood of account 
misstatements were influenced by their beliefs about client competency. The lack of 
significance when sample size was the dependent variable in the model suggests that 
perceived client competency had no influence on the selected sample size. In addition, the 
lack of results for irrelevant information, suggests that the presence of minor errors had a 
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greater influence on participant beliefs about client competency than the presence of 
irrelevant information.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to investigate how auditors are influenced by the 
presence of irrelevant information and minor errors when reviewing audit evidence 
produced by the client. To address that question this paper conducted an experiment 
designed to examine how public accountants respond to dirty documents. Participants with 
public accounting experience assumed the role of a staff auditor completing the accounts 
receivable portion of an audit. Their task was to review a client provided piece of audit 
evidence and to determine what the likelihood of misstatement and the appropriate sample 
size for the resulting audit test.  
There are four key findings. First, the results indicate that the presence of irrelevant 
information and minor errors influenced subsequent auditor skeptical judgments and 
actions. Specifically, the presence of minor errors in audit evidence led to increases in the 
estimates of account misstatement likelihood and led to increases in sample size. In 
instances where irrelevant information was present, auditors kept the likelihood of 
misstatement constant, but responded by increasing the sample size. The change in sample 
size suggests that irrelevant information may be perceived suspiciously, and while the risk 
assessment does not immediately increase, auditors cover themselves by increasing the 
sample size. Perhaps the similar actions indicate that auditor training acts as a modifier for 
trait skepticism. Second, this study provides evidence that a dilution effect does not always 
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occur when auditors are provided with irrelevant information. Prior literature using second-
hand anecdotal evidence finds that the strength of auditor decisions is reduced when 
auditors are provided with irrelevant information. This study’s audit setting utilizes records 
produced directly by the client (and therefore experienced first-hand by the auditor) and 
finds that no dilution effect occurs.  
Third, responses to debriefing questions indicate that as much as 30 percent of an 
auditor’s time on-site can involve cleaning up dirty client documents. This finding serves 
to support the notion that dirty documents may contribute to over auditing, which is a waste 
of financial resources and a stressful misuse of audit staff. Lastly, although a number of 
prior studies find trait skepticism to be influential, our study adds to the growing evidence 
(e.g., Carpenter and Reimers 2013) that this may not always be the case. In other words, 
auditors with higher levels of trait skepticism are not more likely to make more skeptical 
judgments when evaluating audit evidence. 
The results of this study are subject to the limitations that apply to any research that 
employs a judgment and decision making setting. In addition, the lack of being able to 
identify where auditors focused their attention when making their assessment of the audit 
evidence is also a limitation. The results show that trait skepticism influences skeptical 
judgment; however, without being able to identify what participants focused on while 
reviewing the audit evidence it is difficult to fully understand how the auditor completes 
their task. This limitation provides motivation to extend this experiment by using eye-
tracking technology to identify what specific audit evidence is perceived as most relevant. 
Therefore, in Part 3, this paper utilizes eye-tracking equipment to record each participant’s 
eye movements while reviewing the audit evidence.    
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Part 2: If Eyes are the Window to Our Soul, What Role does Eye-Tracking Play in 
Accounting Research? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Eye-tracking technology has the potential to be extremely useful in accounting 
research. This paper discusses some key features of eye-tracking technology and reviews 
eye-tracking JDM research. Eye-tracking technology enables us to identify the specific 
factors focused upon in performing a decision making task. In addition, eye-tracking also 
enables us to identify the visual search strategies employed in performing a decision 
making task. Eye-tracking metrics provide evidence as to what data engage a person’s 
attention. In a decision making setting, a person’s focus of attention suggests what 
information is perceived as most relevant to the task (Glöckner and Herbold 2011; Oliveira 
et al. 2016). 
Contemporary state-of-the-art eye-tracking technology provides an unprecedented 
opportunity for accounting research. Until recently, eye-tracking technology was a 
relatively unknown and unwieldly tool to use. Early eye-tracking was a slow process that 
required researchers to analyze eye-tracking data frame by frame. However, companies 
like Apple, Microsoft, and Google ramped up interest by integrating eye-tracking features 
into consumer electronic devices (Chen, Jermia, and Panggabean 2016). In addition, 
companies such as Gazepoint, Eye Tribe, Locarna, and Tobii adapted the technology to 
more practical desktop and laptop eye-trackers. The improved mobility, precision and 
integrated analytic software tools raise eye tracking to an entirely new level of 
functionality. For example, the eye-tracking equipment from Tobii captures images at a 
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rate of 60 images per second with an accuracy of 0.4 degrees (i.e., roughly the size of a 
letter in a word file). 
Prior to the development and increased availability of eye-tracking technology, 
accounting researchers used verbal protocol analysis to conduct visual attention research 
in accounting. Verbal protocol analysis requires participants to verbally think aloud or self-
report as they work through a task (Bouwman 1985). However, verbal protocol analysis 
has several potential limitations. For example, participants may not be able to accurately 
report their mental processes, the act of reporting may cause participants to think 
differently, and the researcher could have trouble encoding and/or be biased in their coding 
of participant responses (Hayes 1982; Hoque 2006).  
Eye-tracking technology not only eliminates some of the problems associated with 
verbal protocol analysis, but also offers certain advantages over verbal protocol analysis. 
The advantages of eye-tracking technology include: (1) capturing data in real-time while a 
test subject performs a decision making task; (2) gathering data relating to unconscious 
cognitive processes that would otherwise be impossible to gather with self-reporting; (3) 
measuring constructs that people are unable, uncomfortable, or unwilling to truthfully self-
report; and (4) a relatively autonomous data collection process which minimizes participant 
manipulation, subjectivity bias, social desirability bias, and demand effects (Dimoka et al. 
2012). 
On the other hand, there are some relative disadvantages. The eye-tracking 
equipment can be costly.14 Scheduling and calibrating multiple test subjects (one at a time) 
for the eye-tracking lab may be time consuming and complicated. Also, large amounts of 
                                                          
14 The equipment manufacturers did not respond to my inquiries regarding cost. However, the VCU eye-
tracking equipment (2 computers) was $30,000.  
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eye scan data may be collected. Depending on the circumstances, it may be difficult to 
interpret this data (Rayner 1998; Djamasbi 2014).   
 At first glance it may seem eye-tracking is the preferred method to use over verbal 
protocol analysis. However, they could actually work to complement each other in practice. 
For instance, eye-tracking highlights where peoples’ attention is focused when performing 
a task, but does not explain why they focused their attention in that area. Verbal protocol 
analysis offers the possibility that the participant may reveal why they are focusing their 
attention on a particular area when performing a task.  
Despite a call to use eye-tracking in accounting research by Birnberg and Shields 
(1984), only four recent studies in accounting utilize eye-tracking technology (Kramer and 
Maas 2016; Sirois, Bedard, and Bera 2015; Chen et al. 2016; Bellora-Bienengräber, 
Mertins, and Bassen 2017). Perhaps accounting researchers were discouraged by the 
unwieldiness and expense of earlier versions of eye-tracking equipment, and/or perhaps 
the earlier analytical software was perceived as clumsy or imprecise. In any event, although 
accounting research appears slow to utilize eye-tracking technology, other disciplines such 
as psychology (e.g., Armstrong and Olatunji 2012), education (e.g., Lai et al. 2013), and 
marketing (e.g., Wedel and Pieters 2008) extensively use eye-tracking technology. 
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to identify areas where eye-tracking may 
enhance research in accounting. In addition, this paper reviews extant literature where eye-
tracking is applied to various judgment and decision-making contexts. Finally, this paper 
provides an overview of the common eye-tracking metrics and their application in research. 
The remainder of this paper will be organized into the following sections: Section II 
provides background on eye-tracking technology, Section III describes the structure of the 
53 
 
literature review, Section IV reviews and synthesizes the literature, Section V provides 
suggestions for future research, and Section VI presents the overall conclusions. 
II. EYE-TRACKING METRICS AND THEIR USES 
  Orquin and Loose (2013) define attention as selectivity in perception. Since “[t]he 
primary objective of accounting is to provide information that helps decision makers make 
better decisions” (Bouwman 1985 pp1), it is important for researchers to investigate how 
accountants and other related professionals make decisions. One component of examining 
the decision-making process is determining on what or where people focus their attention 
when making decisions. Extant research indicates that eye fixations (i.e., when someone 
focuses their visual gaze on a single location) are a good indirect measure of visual 
attention (e.g., Deubel and Schneider 1996; Hoffman and Subramaniam 1995; Glaholt and 
Reingold 2009). Thus, eye-tracking technology allows researchers to examine where 
attention is focused when making decisions (See Table 8 for examples of common eye-
tracking technologies used in studies reviewed in this paper). Common measures of 
attention include: fixations, dwell time, areas of interest, saccades, and heat maps or gaze 
plots.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Fixation is a term used to describe when someone looks at a particular data element 
or location for an extended period of time (Duchowski 2002). The more times or the longer 
someone fixates on a particular spot in an eye-tracking study, the greater the number of 
fixations or fixation time. Extant research on fixations suggests that fixations reflect and 
influence preferences (Armel et al. 2008; Krajbich et al. 2010, 2012) and that people have 
a higher fixation likelihood on attributes relevant to reaching a decision (Glöckner and 
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Herbold 2011; Oliveira et al. 2016). Research in neuroscience also finds evidence that 
fixations are associated with portions in the brain associated with decision making (Lim, 
O’Doherty, and Rangel 2011). 
Dwell time is a term used to describe the sum of fixations in one area before a 
participant fixates on another area (Bialkova and van Trijp 2011). Longer dwell times, 
fixation durations, gaze times indicate higher levels of processing (Velichokovsky 1999; 
Velichokovsky, Rothert, Kopf, Dornhofer, and Joos 2002; Glöckner and Herbold 2011). 
Longer fixations or dwell times spent on specific points could also suggest participants 
have trouble interpreting evidence (Goldberg and Kotval 1999). 
Areas of interest (AOI) or regions of interest are areas of visual interest defined by 
the researcher during the experiment (Kim, Seligman, and Kable 2012; Su, Rao, Li, Wang, 
and Li 2012; Ashby and Rakow 2015). Researchers use AOI’s to compare and contrast the 
amount of time participants spend viewing particular areas of a visual stimulus. For 
example, Chen and Pu (2010) examine how online shoppers react to two different 
recommendation interfaces for products. They define areas of interest as groupings of 
products in the two interfaces and investigate the frequency and dwell time participants 
fixate on those areas.  
Saccades are quick eye movements between locations or fixations (Sperling and 
Weichselgartner 1995; Pieters and Warlop 1999; Su et al. 2012). Researchers use saccades 
to track eye-movement, as well as to examine the number of times participants shift 
between areas of interest or within areas of interest. For instance, Pieters and Warlop 
(1999) find that the number of inter-brand saccades increase and the number of intra-brand 
saccades decrease when consumers are making product decisions under time pressure.   
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Researchers develop heat maps or gaze plots to visually represent where 
participants look in eye-tracking studies (See Figure 7 below for an example). Gaze plots 
show a participant’s sequence of fixations including fixation points and saccades 
(Djamasbi 2014). Heat maps show where participants gaze and use colors to show where 
fixations are the highest. The brighter the color, the more attention was given to that part 
of the visual stimulus. Heat maps primarily provide information about the trends in viewing 
intensity. For instance, Djamasbi, Siegel, and Tullis (2011), find that participants are drawn 
to human faces, and the presence of human faces can divert attention from the task. 
Although heat maps are typically not included in the primary analyses of eye-tracking 
studies, Djamasbi (2014) recommends calculating the distribution of fixations on heat 
maps and comparing them across viewers. For example, Djamasbi, Siegel, Skorinko, and 
Tullis (2011), use a heat map analysis to examine the website viewing behavior of different 
generations, and find that baby boomers are much more thorough when viewing websites 
than younger generations. See Table 9 for a summary of the key terms mentioned above. 
 [Insert Figure 7 here] 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW STRUCTURE 
 In order to augment the assimilation of prior research across multiple disciplines, 
this paper borrows from the organizational framework developed by Orquin and Loose 
(2013). Orquin and Loose (2013) conduct a detailed review of studies that use eye-tracking 
technology to examine attention and decision making. Their review synthesizes research 
across marketing, psychology, public policy and health, and neuroscience.  
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Orquin and Loose (2013) organize their findings from studies examining attention 
and decision making into four categories: stimulus driven attention, goal-driven attention, 
attention and working memory, and down-stream effects. For this review, this paper uses 
three of the four categories from Orquin and Loose (See Figure 8 for further detail). The 
fourth category was dropped because it is already covered as a subset of the other three. In 
addition, this paper also includes more recent studies, including four in accounting. Lastly, 
for each category this paper identifies potential areas of future research or application in 
accounting. 
[Insert Figure 8 here] 
IV. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Goal-Driven Attention 
 Goal-driven attention (also known as top-down processing or endogenous 
attention) occurs when a person’s focus of attention pertains to the demands of the task 
(Theeuwes 2010; Orquin and Loose 2013; Meißner, Musalem, and Huber 2016). One could 
argue that eye-tracking research relating to goal-driven attention is particularly applicative 
to accounting/auditing tasks. An auditor, for example, assigned the task of assessing the 
likelihood of an account misstatement, must focus attention on data elements/information 
that are relevant to the task. Consistent with Orquin and Loose (2013), this paper organizes 
research in this area into the following five subcategories: task instructions, utility effect, 
heuristics, attention phases, and learning effects. 
Task Instructions 
 Goal-driven attention may be influenced by the nature of the task instructions or 
goals. Research in this area finds that different task-specific instructions or different goals 
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can lead to different scan paths through the same stimuli (e.g., Yarbus 1967; Glöckner, 
Fiedler, Hochman, Ayal, and Hilbig 2012; Kim et al. 2012; Toubia, de Jong, Stieger, and 
Füller 2012). Other research focuses on how changes in task specific demands influence 
attention (e.g., Pieters and Warlop 1999; Selart, Kuvaas, Boe, and Takemura 2006). For 
instance, Pieters and Warlop (1999) examine how consumer brand choice varies depending 
on the presence of time pressure and the presence of high motivation to perform well. They 
find that people work faster under time pressure and slower when there is high motivation 
to perform well. Specifically, in terms of eye-tracking, they find the presence of time 
pressure leads to lower fixation durations among alternatives and increased inter-brand 
saccades. While the presence of high motivation to perform well leads to higher fixation 
durations and lower inter-brand saccades. Similarly, other studies investigate how changes 
in task specific motivation (e.g., the motivation to select the healthy option) influence 
attention and find results consistent with task specific demands (e.g., Visschers, Hess, and 
Siegrist 2010; Bialkova and Trijp 2011; Van Herpen and Van Trijp 2011).  
Utility Effect 
 Goal-driven attention may be influenced by a utility effect. The utility effect 
basically says that people focus relatively more on information that is perceived to have 
greater importance or value for the task (Glöckner et al., 2012). The utility effect is the 
most robust finding from eye-tracking studies in decision making and has been 
demonstrated across a variety of tasks (Orquin and Loose 2013). Important findings in this 
area include that participants tend to have more fixations on attributes of greater importance 
to their decision (Glöckner and Herbold, 2011; Glöckner et al., 2012; Meißner et al. 2016), 
longer first fixation durations (Glaholt & Reingold, 2012), and longer first dwell durations 
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on the items of final selection (Glaholt and Reingold 2009, 2011; Schotter, Berry, 
McKenzie, and Rayner 2010). In other words, people spend more time initially and more 
time in general focusing on the items or the attributes of those items they believe are most 
relevant to their decision. 
 Eye-tracking research also finds that people are likely to have their first and last 
fixations on the item they ultimately select (Glaholt and Reingold 2011; Schotter et al. 
2010; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011). Furthermore, numerous studies find that the likelihood 
of fixating on the option they will ultimately select increases until the decision is made 
(e.g., Atalay, Bodur, and Rasolofoarison 2012; Fiedler and Glöckner 2012). This emphasis 
on the option of choice in decision making tasks is called the gaze cascade effect (Shimojo, 
Simion, Shimojo, and Scheier 2003). This gaze cascade effect is supported by numerous 
studies (e.g., Meißner et al. 2012; Shi et al. 2013). Conversely, recent studies such as 
Nittono and Wada (2009) and Bird, Lauwereyns, and Crawford (2012) provide evidence 
that gaze allocation (i.e., where people allocate their visual attention) has no impact on 
final decisions and therefore reject the gaze cascade effect. As an alternative to the gaze 
cascade effect, Glaholt and Reingold (2009a; 2009b; 2011) develop an analysis based on 
dwell sequences that illustrates that dwell frequencies and dwell times increase towards the 
chosen option in decision making. 
Heuristics 
Heuristics are methods or shortcuts people use to help solve problems and make 
decisions more quickly in information rich environments (e.g., Gigerenzer et al. 1999). 
Heuristics may also influence goal driven attention. Bounded rationality models (see 
Simon 1957) suggest that people use heuristics to make decisions when they face situations 
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that exceed their processing capacity. Consistent with bounded rationality models, eye-
tracking research finds that heuristics influence attention (e.g., Day, Lin, Huang, and 
Chuang 2009; Day 2010; Renkewitz and Jahn 2012). For instance, Day et al. (2009) 
manipulate the type of decision making strategy employed by subjects (weighted additive 
rule (WADD) vs. elimination by aspects method (EBA)). They find that participants using 
the WADD search strategy view more information and spend more time re-visiting pieces 
of information than participants using the EBA strategy. These findings suggest that the 
type of heuristic used could influence where people focus their attention. 
 Despite the eye-tracking research findings suggesting heuristics influence attention, 
efforts in eye-tracking to predict behavior using only one heuristic has often been 
unsuccessful (e.g., Knoepfle, Tao-yi Wang, and Camerer 2009; Glöckner and Herbold, 
2011; Shi et al. 2013). For example, Shi et al. (2013) investigate how consumers make 
decisions on comparison websites that use matrices to evaluate different attributes between 
products. Results of their eye-tracking analysis indicate that decision makers frequently 
shift their attention between alternative and attribute-wise transition patterns within a single 
decision task. In other words, they find that decision makers tend to shift between focusing 
on different alternatives, and focusing on specific attributes of alternatives, suggesting that 
consumers do not use one single heuristic when making decisions.  
Attention Phases 
 Goal-driven attention may also be influenced by the phase of the task. Eye-tracking 
research finds that attention during decision making tasks can be broken down into the 
following three general phases: overview (beginning of the task), comparison (middle of 
the task), and checking (end of the task) phases (Russo and Leclerc 1994; Clement 2007; 
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Glaholt and Reingold 2011). For example, Krajbich and Rangel (2011) and Krajbich et al. 
(2012), provide evidence that fixations during the overview phase and checking phase are 
much shorter than the fixations during the comparison phase. Similarly, Glöckner and 
Herbold (2011) find evidence that the first 10-20 initial fixations in choice tasks are much 
shorter than later fixations. These findings suggest that people focus their attention on 
information more during the comparison phase.  
Learning Effects 
 Goal-driven attention may also be impacted by a learning effect associated with 
repeated exposure to the task. Eye-tracking research on learning effects looks at how 
repeated trials influence the attention of participants when completing decision tasks. 
Results of these studies indicate that as participant learning increases, the number of 
fixations decreases (Bialkova and van Trijp 2011; Knoepfle et al. 2009; Fiedler and 
Glöckner 2012; Ashby and Rakow 2016). In addition, there is evidence that the utility 
effect (i.e., people tend to focus on the pieces of information they believe to be the most 
relevant) increases with learning and participants fixate more on important attributes in 
their decisions (Meißner and Decker 2010; Meißner et al., 2012; Meißner et al. 2016). 
These results suggest that the more experience people have with tasks, the less time they 
need to view details before reaching a decision. 
 In accounting, Kramer and Maas (2016) investigate whether learning effects lead 
to an evaluation bias in a performance review setting. Kramer and Maas manipulate 
whether subjects previously recommend for or against promoting a subordinate, and then 
have subjects rate the performance of the same subordinate in the current period after 
reviewing a balanced scorecard. Results of their analysis show that prior experience leads 
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to bias in performance judgments, but it does not have any impact on the attention placed 
on the various attributes of the scorecard. 
Stimulus Driven Attention 
Stimulus driven attention (also known as bottom-up processing or exogenous 
attention) describes situations where attention is influenced by the attributes of the 
stimulus. These attributes include saliency, surface size, visual clutter, and position 
(Corbetta and Schulman 2002; Theeuwes 2010; Orquin and Loose 2013). Eye tracking 
research relating to stimulus-driven attention is potentially applicable to 
accounting/auditing tasks. For example, in a set of financial statements, our attention may 
be influenced by: a full page colorful graphics, bold text, the amount of detail or lengthy 
footnotes, and the overall organization of the information. Consistent with Orquin and 
Loose (2013), this paper organizes research observations in this area into the following 
four subcategories: saliency, surface size, visual clutter, and position. 
Saliency 
 In eye-tracking research saliency refers to objects that stand out compared to others. 
Eye-tracking research on saliency finds that people pay relatively more attention to 
attributes that stand out compared to others when making decisions (e.g., Lohse 1997; 
Biaalkova and van Trijp 2011; Mormann, Navalpakkam, Koch, and Rangel 2012; 
Mormann, Towal, and Koch 2013). For example, Lohse (1997) examines how people react 
to changes in advertisement attributes in the yellow pages. He finds that people spend more 
time viewing advertisements that stand out in terms of color or bold text. Similarly, 
Bialkova and van Trijp (2011) and Mormann et al. (2012), find, in a consumer purchase 
setting, that the relatively more salient attributes of products attract greater attention. This 
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bias ultimately has downstream effects as well (i.e., this bias influences the final decision), 
as results indicate that consumers tend to make decisions in favor of the more salient option 
(Lohse 1997; Mormann et al. 2012; Navalpakkam, Kumar, Li, and Sivakumar 2012; 
Orquin, Scholderer, and Jeppesen 2012). 
Surface Size 
 Surface size refers to the amount of space a visual object takes up. Eye-tracking 
research on surface size finds that the greater the surface size the greater the level of 
attention (e.g., Lohse 1997; Janiszewski 1998; Chandon, Hutchinson, Bradlow, and Young 
2009). Lohse (1997) finds that advertisements that take up more space attract more 
attention (i.e., the more fixations and longer dwell times) than smaller advertisements in 
the yellow pages. Similarly, Chandon et al. (2009) examine surface size when considering 
in-store arrangements of product. They find that the greater number of facings of a product 
on a store shelf the more attention that product receives and the greater the likelihood of 
its selection.  
Visual Clutter 
 Visual clutter refers to the presence of excess items, level of detail, or general 
organization of information within a specified viewing area. For instance, whether there 
are five easy to read columns on a spreadsheet versus ten hard to read columns on a 
spreadsheet. Eye-tracking research on visual clutter finds that people pay less attention to 
individual attributes with cluttered products (e.g., Visschers et al. 2010; Orth and Crouch 
2014). For instance, Visschers et al. (2010) examine consumer choice of breakfast cereals 
with a focus on selecting a healthy option. Results indicate that with more cluttered product 
designs participants spend less time (i.e., dwell time) looking at nutrition labels. This 
63 
 
suggests that the more stimuli a person has to take in when making a decision, the less 
attention that person will use to assess the individual attributes of that decision. 
Position 
 Numerous eye-tracking studies find that positioning of information impacts 
attention (e.g., Sütterlin, Brunner, and Opwis 2008; Chandon et al., 2009; Huang and Kuo 
2011; Scholz, Helversen, and Rieskamp 2015). For example, the location of information 
in a list or among various options can determine the level of attention it receives. In eye-
tracking research, when consulting a list, a list position effect occurs (e.g., Sütterlin et al. 
2008; Chen and Pu 2010; Huang and Kuo 2011; Shi, Wedel, and Pieters 2013). For 
example, Sütterlin et al. (2008) find that items at the top of a list tend to receive more 
attention (i.e., more fixations and longer dwell times) than items at the bottom of a list. 
This is possibly a result of decision makers preferring to read left to right or top to bottom 
(Orquin and Loose 2013). Therefore, items at the bottom of the list or to the right in an 
assortment of options receive less attention. 
 In a consumer product choice setting, eye-tracking research finds evidence of a 
central position effect (e.g., Chandon et al., 2009; Chen and Pu 2010; Glaholt, Wu, and 
Reingold 2010; Navalpakkam et al. 2012; Shi, Wedel, and Pieters, 2013). For instance, 
Chandon et al. (2009), examine consumer choice among products located on a store shelf. 
They find that consumers give products on the center of the shelf more attention (i.e., more 
fixations and longer dwell times) and are more likely to select them over products located 
on other areas such as the bottom of the shelf. Tatler, Hayhoe, Land, and Ballard (2011) 
argue this is because people tend to focus on the center of the screen, but Atalay et al. 
64 
 
(2012) provide evidence that people focus on the centrally positioned item regardless of 
location of information. 
Attention and Working Memory 
Eye-tracking research in attention and working memory examines the biological 
limitation in our ability to process relevant information (Awh, Vogel, and Oh 2006). 
Although eye-tracking studies in this area include both stimulus-driven and goal-driven 
attention processes, the unique nature of this research warrants its own separate section. 
Consistent with Orquin and Loose (2013), this paper organizes research in this area into 
the following seven subcategories: consideration sets, pairwise comparisons, information 
complexity, presentation effects, decision difficulty, time pressure, and distractors.  
Consideration Sets 
 Consideration sets are sub-sets of information within a set of choices that decision 
makers base their decision on (Howard and Sheth 1969). For example, if you have ten 
initial options, but narrow your final decision down to two or three options then those two 
or three final options would be the consideration set. Eye-tracking research in this area is 
motivated by the findings of several studies indicating that people ignore portions of 
available information when making decisions (e.g., Chen and Pu 2010; Ghaholt, Wu, and 
Reingold 2010; Toubia et al. 2012; Ashby and Rakow 2015). Thus, eye-tracking research 
on consideration explores why people ignore portions of available information when 
making decisions. Consideration sets tend to include one to four alternatives (Shi et al. 
2013), options in the consideration set are more likely to be selected as the final choice 
(Chandon et al. 2009), and there is also a tendency to focus attention on items in the 
consideration set (Glaholt et al. 2009). Unfortunately, it is still unclear as to why certain 
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information is included or not included in a decision set. However, it appears that 
consideration sets may function as an unconscious mechanism for reducing working 
memory load (i.e., total mental effort). 
Pair-wise Comparisons 
 Pair-wise comparisons refer to a situation where a person compares several items 
by looking back and forth between them. Eye-tracking research finds that people use pair-
wise comparisons to evaluate two, three, or four alternatives (Russo and Rosen 1975; Russo 
1978; Russo and Leclerc 1994). Studies in this area find people prefer to perform 
comparisons among two items versus three or four (Glaholt and Reingold 2011), and that 
people prefer comparing items located close together or under a similar brand (Russo and 
Rosen 1975; Van Raaij 1977; Ballard, Hayhoe, and Pelz 1995). Overall, these results 
suggest people unconsciously seek out ways to reduce working memory load when making 
decisions. 
Information Complexity 
 As used in eye-tracking research, information complexity refers to the number of 
choices or number of attributes that must be processed in performing the task. Eye-tracking 
research finds that as the number of choices or attributes increases, there is an increase in 
the number of fixations, but a decrease in the total amount of information viewed (e.g., 
Horstmann, Ahlgrimm, and Glöckner 2009; Reutskaja, Nagel, Camerer, and Rangel 2011; 
Wang, Yang, Liu, Cao, and Ma 2014). In terms of dwell time, eye-tracking research finds 
conflicting results. In some instances, dwell time increases (Horstmann et al. 2009; Wang 
et al. 2014) and others where dwell time decreases as information complexity increases 
(Chen and Pu 2010; Reutskaja et al. 2011; Orth and Crouch 2014). These findings appear 
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to suggest that there is a biological limit as to how much available information a person 
can process in working memory. 
Presentation Effects 
 Presentation effects research in eye-tracking explores how the format of 
information influences attention. Eye-tracking research indicates that the use of written 
product representations or descriptions instead of images can lead to fewer fixations, 
shorter dwell times, and different attributes being fixated on (Van Raaij 1977; Smead, 
Wilcox, and Wilkes 1981; Van Herpen and Van Trijp 2011; Loose and Orquin 2012). For 
example, Van Herpen and Van Trijp (2011) examine how consumers react to different 
nutrition label formats when goals and time constraints are varied. They find that 
consumers focus on product logos and packaging design instead of information in nutrition 
tables. Similarly, Townsend and Kahn (2014) compare product choices when confronted 
with verbal product descriptions versus visual product descriptions, and find evidence that 
people take longer to process information with the visual stimuli compared to the verbal 
stimuli. Thus, these studies suggest presentation format can influence working memory 
load (i.e., total mental effort) and impact what attributes consumers fixate on. 
In accounting, several recent eye-tracking studies examine how presentation effects 
impact decision making (Sirois et al. 2015; Bellora-Bienengräber et al. 2017; Chen et al. 
2016). Sirois et al. (2015) investigate whether adding a key audit matters section to an audit 
report impacts non-professional investors. Their results indicate that the addition of a key 
audit matters sections can increase attention to specific financial statement disclosures. 
They also find evidence of a potential negative impact. Specifically, they find that non-
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professional investors perceive there to be different levels of assurance between different 
accounts and investors have lower perceptions of audit quality. 
Bellora-Bienengräber et al. (2017) and Chen et al. (2016) both examine manager 
decision making when using balanced scorecards. Bellora-Bienengräber et al. (2017) 
examine how the format of corporate social responsibility (CSR) information in a balanced 
scorecard influences manager evaluations of subordinates. They manipulate the presence 
of time pressure and the format of CSR information in a balanced scorecard and measure 
the impact on performance evaluations and bonus allocation. Results of their analysis 
reveal that separating out CSR information in balanced scorecards leads to more attention 
being focused on that information, but there is no impact on performance evaluations. 
Chen et al. (2016) examine the role of visual attention on the promotion decisions 
of managers. They manipulate the format of strategic information given in balanced 
scorecards. Using eye-tracking technology, Chen et al. track what attributes of balanced 
scorecards managers focus on when making promotion decisions. They find that managers 
who focus more on strategically linked attributes regardless of presentation format made 
better promotion decisions (i.e., they recommend promoting people whose prior 
achievements coincide more with the objectives of the company) than managers who only 
focus on attributes. 
Decision Difficulty 
As used in eye-tracking research, decision difficulty refers to the extent to which 
alternatives differ. The extant literature consists of purchase decisions (where one product 
is chosen from among several) or gambles (choosing between two gambles with related 
payouts and probabilities). Basically, research finds that choices between similar options 
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require more fixations in order to perform the decision making task (Glöckner and Herbold 
2011; Krajbich and Rangel 2011; Fiedler and Glöckner 2012). Although, Russo and Dosher 
(1983) find decision difficulty has no influence on the number of transitions between 
alternatives. These results suggest difficult decisions increase working memory load, but 
the number of times attention shifts between alternatives remains constant. 
Time Pressure 
 Eye-tracking studies examining time pressure demonstrate that reduced time leads 
to shorter fixation duration, fewer fixations on textual elements, more attribute transitions, 
and less overall information fixated on (Pieters and Warlop 1999; Reutskaja et al. 2011; 
Van Herpen and Trijp 2011). Furthermore, Mormann et al. (2012) find that time pressure 
leads to a greater influence of visual saliency on decision choice. Thus, under time pressure 
people spend less time processing the various attributes and select the more prominent 
option. These findings suggest that time pressure can reduce the amount of analysis (i.e., 
working memory load) taking place in order to meet a deadline.  
In accounting, Bellora-Bienengräber et al. (2017) examine how time pressure 
influences a manager’s performance evaluation of subordinates. They manipulate the 
presence of time pressure and the format of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
information in a balanced scorecard and measure the impact on performance evaluations 
and bonus allocation. Results of their analysis reveal that time pressure reduces 
performance ratings. Thus, this paper suggests that managers under time pressure provide 
lower performance ratings. 
Distractors 
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 A distractor potentially diverts attention away from a task. Eye-tracking research 
on distractors finds somewhat counterintuitive results (e.g., Day, Shyi, and Wang 2006; 
Day et al. 2009). For example, Day et al. (2006) examine whether flash banners (i.e., 
animated interactive website advertisements that can include sound and complex 
animations like movies) containing irrelevant information distract consumers in an online 
multi-attribute decision-making setting where one product must be chosen from a set of 
alternatives. They find that not only are participants not distracted by the flash banners, but 
their level of arousal and accuracy in decision making actually increases when the flash 
banners are present.  
Similarly, Day et al. (2009) study whether music tempo and task difficulty 
influences decision making in a multi-attribute decision-making setting. They find that the 
potential distractor (i.e., a fast music tempo in this case) increases the level of decision 
accuracy. Specifically, they found that with the faster music tempo led to a different search 
pattern and more information being searched. These findings suggest distractors may 
increase the level of interest in tasks and improve outcomes. In view of the unexpected 
results, one could argue that these studies were not actually testing distractors, but were 
actually testing enhancers of attention. Intuitively, a distractor should negatively impact on 
performance in a decision making task, therefore further research is required to explain 
these findings. 
V. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
What role can eye-tracking technology play in accounting research? As noted 
earlier a distinct advantage of an eye-tracking research tool is that it records unconscious 
cognitive participant responses. Therefore, the research data is relatively less subject to 
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participant manipulation, subjectivity bias, social desirability bias, and demand effects. 
Furthermore, eye-tracking technology can reduce common method bias since its use 
reduces the reliance on one particular measurement method (Dimoka et al. 2012). In a 
decision-making setting, we observe the participant’s focus of attention which in turn 
suggests what information is perceived as most relevant to the task. Eye-tracking 
contributes to the literature by providing additional insight into what information is actually 
included in the decision versus what the test subjects “say” they think is relevant. In 
addition eye-tracking allows us to view the visual search strategies employed when 
performing a task. 
Goal-Driven Attention 
 One potential area for future research involves research in goal-driven attention 
settings. Eye-tracking researchers in other fields find that people use heuristics in decision-
making settings. In accounting, numerous studies over the years examine heuristics (for 
literature reviews on heuristics see Solomon and Tortman 2003 and Trotman, Tan, and Ang 
2011). Therefore, future research could re-examine accounting studies on heuristics 
incorporating new eye-tracking measures. For instance, in cases where multiple heuristics 
could lead to the same decision, eye-tracking could be useful in determining which is being 
used. Specifically, researchers may identify whether there is a particular heuristic used by 
top performing auditors that helps them perform their duties more effectively. A heuristic 
employed by top performing auditors could then be incorporated into staff training or even 
in accounting education.  
To illustrate, Griffith, Hammersley, Kadous, and Young (2015) use an experiment 
to examine whether an auditor’s mindset can influence subsequent auditor judgments of 
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complex estimates. Their primary dependent variables were the reasonableness of the 
complex estimate, the decision about what action to take next, and the reason for taking 
that action. They find that auditors prompted to approach the case with a deliberative 
mindset (i.e., thinking more broadly and incorporating information from a variety of 
sources) outperform those using different mindsets. In other words, they find that auditors 
using a deliberative mindset are able to process a wider range of information and better 
identify unreasonable client estimates. Eye-tracking technology could contribute to this 
study and studies like this one by allowing researchers to see what particular pieces of 
information auditors focus on when making their decisions. Specifically, eye-tracking 
could help Griffith et al. answer questions such as: Did the more effective auditors use a 
different and a potentially more effective scan path through the case materials? Did the 
auditors consider all pieces of information available in the case equally or did they focus 
attention on specific attributes?  
Another potential research topic is how the utility effect (i.e., the tendency for 
people to focus on information they believe to be more relevant) identified in other fields 
of eye-tracking research applies to accountants. For instance, researchers could use eye-
tracking to identify what information audit managers focus on when conducting reviews. 
For example, Brazel, Jackson, Schaefer, and Stewart (2016) use an experiment to examine 
whether a supervisor’s review of audit staff work is influenced by the outcome of the 
testing. Their dependent measure was participants’ performance evaluation rating of the 
person in the experimental case. They find that when the additional work performed by 
staff failed to find a misstatement that supervisors were then more likely to give lower 
performance evaluations. Eye-tracking could identify the supervisor’s focus of attention 
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while reviewing the workpapers. For example, a lower performance evaluation may also 
be associated with circumstances where the supervisor’s focus of attention suggests 
concern with the underlying documentation. Therefore, eye-tracking could build upon 
Brazel et al. (2016) by confirming that the supervisor was impacted by the ‘failure to find 
a misstatement’ and not some other attribute of the auditor’s work, such as substandard 
documentation.   
Stimulus Driven Attention 
 With respect to stimulus driven attention settings, researchers could examine what 
information users of financial information value the most. For instance, what parts of the 
financial statements receive the most emphasis (i.e., MD&A, footnotes, charts, 
illustrations, basic financial statements)? What types of information or sections in the 
MD&A receive the most attention? Is management’s explanation for unsatisfactory 
performance relatively ignored versus forward looking information? In the financial 
statements, do people pay attention to the footnotes or other substantive information? What 
line items receive the most attention? How does the format influence the user’s focus of 
attention?  
For example, Dilla, Janvrin, and Jeffrey (2013) examine in an experimental setting 
whether professional and non-professional investors’ react differently to pro-forma 
earnings information when presented in different formats (i.e., graphical vs. textual). They 
conclude that graphical presentations of earnings information influence non-professional 
investors’ judgments of current year earnings performance, future earnings potential, and 
potential investment amount. However, graphical presentations only influence professional 
investors’ judgments of future earnings potential and potential investment amount. Eye-
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tracking technology could be utilized to build upon Dilla et al. (2013) by allowing for a 
more precise investigation of the differences between in presentation format in terms of the 
specific factors focused upon, the search strategies employed, and patterns in considering 
various pieces of information.  
Another potential topic to explore in stimulus driven settings is how proposed 
regulatory changes influence users of financial statements, tax forms, or audit reports. For 
example, if regulators propose a revision to the audit report that highlights a specific issue, 
do users actually pay attention to the new information or does the change go unnoticed or 
lead to other changes in judgment (e.g., Sirois et al. 2015)? In Assay, Libby, and 
Rennekamp (2014), they examine the impact of pronoun use in management disclosures 
on investor reactions in an experimental setting. They find that the increased use of 
personal pronouns leads to stronger reactions from investors (i.e., larger changes in investor 
valuation of stock value). Eye-tracking technology could examine whether attributes 
similar to pronouns (e.g., bold colors, font types, or pictures) leads to stronger reactions 
from investors. Specifically whether these potential distractors reduce or magnify the 
positivity or negativity of the information being conveyed.  
Attention and Working Memory 
 Regarding attention and working memory load, researchers could use eye-tracking 
technology to investigate how accountants cope with large amounts of information. 
Information overload, or simply receiving too much information has been a topic of interest 
in accounting research for a number of years (see Brown-Liburd, Issa, and Lombardi 2015 
for a brief review). More recently, big data has become a popular area in accounting (e.g., 
Alles 2015; Warren, Moffitt, and Byrnes 2015; Zhang, Yang, and Appelbaum 2015). 
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Therefore, future studies could use eye-tracking to help investigate how auditors react to 
new trends or tools in big-data and at what point information overload becomes an issue. 
The results could help determine at what point big data is too big to be useful to an 
accountant, or at what point there is too much information for auditors to process (e.g., 
while assessing audit risk). It could also be used to investigate the best practices for 
cognitive processing of high volume information streams. To examine this topic, 
researchers could explore how accountants handle continuous streams of potentially 
relevant information from multiple media sources. Research could help accountants train 
and prepare for effective use of big data. 
 Eye-tracking could be used to examine how experience, time pressure, and 
education influence an accountant’s ability to handle large or complicated amounts of 
accounting information. For example, Simnett (1996) examines in an experiment how 
information selection, information processing and task complexity influence the predictive 
accuracy of auditors. The study finds that more experienced auditors are better at selecting 
relevant evidence for their decisions than less experienced auditors, but he finds no 
difference in information processing ability. Eye-tracking could extend Simnett (1996) by 
identifying what visual search strategy is employed as well as what particular attributes are 
selected by more experienced auditors. 
Education and Training 
Lastly, eye-tracking offers a potentially game-changing benefit in an educational 
setting. Eye tracking presents an opportunity for students to learn what an expert 
themselves may not be consciously aware of and able to teach. Specifically, groups of 
people with certain traits or abilities (e.g., outstanding performance, expertise, or 
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experience) could be observed to see if they share a similar distinct scan/search paths 
through a document. If a distinct search path is associated with a preferred outcome, then 
it could be taught to others or information could be rearranged to facilitate a similar default 
scan path. To illustrate, in an education study Mason, Pluchino, and Tornatora (2016) use 
an eye-movement modeling example tool to examine the possibility of improving reading 
comprehension in students. They randomly assign seventh grade students to a condition 
where they use the eye-movement tool or to a condition without the tool. They find that 
students who use the eye-movement modeling tool (i.e., a tool that models how students 
should be processing illustrated text) outperformed those students that did not use the tool. 
This same methodology could be applied to an audit setting. Researchers could examine 
whether more experienced auditors review audit files differently than less experienced 
auditors. If they find cases where they do, then we could train new auditors to use a similar 
approach.  
In addition, on exams or in case studies, eye-tracking could help identify where 
students struggle with general concepts or specific terminology. For example, in an 
auditing case study by Andiola, Lambert, and Lynch (2017), students learn about the audit 
review process through closing review notes in a set of workpapers. Eye-tracking could 
contribute to this case study by helping the authors identify specific terms, sentences or 
concepts that students have difficulty understanding or comprehending. In addition, eye-
tracking could identify specific words, sentences or concepts students, accountants, or 
others are struggling with that they might be embarrassed to admit to, or to which they are 
not self-aware. Eye tracking could also help identify instances where students or others 
have difficulty integrating data from tables/financial statements with text. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper identifies areas where eye-tracking may enhance research in accounting. 
In addition, this paper reviews extant literature where eye-tracking is applied to various 
judgment and decision-making contexts. This paper also provides an overview of the 
common eye-tracking metrics and their potential application to accounting research. 
Although accounting researchers have very limited experience with eye-tracking, other 
disciplines such as psychology (e.g., Armstrong and Olatunji 2012), education (e.g., Lai et 
al. 2013), and marketing (e.g., Wedel and Pieters 2008) extensively use this technology. 
Therefore, in order to demonstrate the usefulness of eye-tracking and to help generate 
potential research topics, this paper also reviews extant literature in other disciplines where 
eye-tracking technology is applied to various judgment and decision-making contexts. 
As noted earlier, several accounting studies examine the role of attention in 
accounting judgment and decision-making contexts. Although these studies thus far 
narrowly focus on manager promotion and performance evaluations (e.g., Chen et al. 2016 
or Kramer and Maas 2016) and changes in the audit report (e.g., Sirois et al. 2015) there 
remains an abundance of future research opportunities. In an effort to stimulate additional 
research, this paper suggests how eye-tracking can enhance extant accounting research. 
Illustrative examples of promising research opportunities (extending extant research) are 
provided under the categories of goal-driven attention, stimulus-driven attention, and 
attention and working memory. In addition, this paper identifies how eye-tracking can be 
applied to more contemporary decision making and educational circumstances. With 
respect to either extant or contemporary research issues, eye-tracking offers the 
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incremental benefit of a more precise investigation of the specific factors focused upon in 
performing a decision making task, as well as the visual search strategy employed. 
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PART 3: The Effect of Irrelevant Information and Minor Errors in Client 
Documents on Audit Student Decisions using Eye-Tracking 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Eye-tracking is the process of measuring a person's eye activity (iMotion 2016). 
Eye-tracking technology allows researchers to examine where attention is focused while 
reviewing case materials and audit evidence. As discussed in Part 2, despite a call to use 
eye-tracking in accounting research by Birnberg and Shields (1984), only four recent 
studies in accounting utilize eye-tracking technology (Kramer and Maas 2016; Sirois, 
Bedard, and Bera 2015; Chen et al. 2016; Bellora-Bienengräber, Mertins, and Bassen 
2017). Although accounting has very limited experience with eye-tracking, other 
disciplines such as psychology (e.g., Armstrong and Olatunji 2012), education (e.g., Lai et 
al. 2013), and marketing (e.g., Wedel and Pieters 2008) extensively use this technology. 
As noted earlier, a distinct advantage of an eye-tracking research tool is that it records 
unconscious cognitive participant responses. Therefore, eye-tracking provides additional 
insight into what information is actually included in the decision. 
To further examine the results from Experiment 1, the third part of this paper 
utilizes eye-tracking to examine how auditing student decisions are influenced by dirty 
documents. Eye-tracking technology allows for a more precise investigation of the specific 
factors focused upon in performing a decision-making task, as well as the visual search 
strategy employed. Consistent with Experiment 1, participants assume the role of a staff 
auditor completing the accounts receivable portion of an audit. The presence of irrelevant 
information and minor errors is manipulated between treatment conditions. After 
participants review the audit evidence they assess the likelihood of account misstatement 
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and the appropriate sample size. Trait skepticism is measured with the Hurtt (2010) 
skepticism scale and participants are divided into high and low skeptic groups based on 
their responses to this scale.  
This study offers several contributions to the literature. First, this study answers the 
long-awaited call by Birnberg and Shields (1984) for the use of eye tracking technology in 
the study of attention in accounting. Recent auditing research using eye-tracking focuses 
on investor perceptions of the audit report (e.g., Sirois, Bedard, and Bera 2015). This study 
builds on this line of literature by applying this new technology to an audit evidence setting 
and lays the foundation for the development of future research applications. 
Second, the eye-tracking results indicate that an individual’s level of attention is 
influenced by the presence of irrelevant information and/or minor errors. Particularly when 
the Control condition with neither irrelevant information nor minor errors was compared 
to Treatment 3 where both irrelevant information and minor errors were present. The 
finding that the two extreme treatment conditions draw the most scrutiny suggests that 
audit evidence which is not consistent with the auditor’s initial level of anticipated risk of 
restatement (including a perfectly clean record) increases the auditor’s attention level. 
Third, the eye-tracking results also suggest that a dilution effect occurs when irrelevant 
information is present. In other words, when auditors encounter audit evidence containing 
irrelevant information they may respond by displaying lower levels of attention than they 
would if no irrelevant information is present. 
The remainder of study will be organized into the following sections: Section II 
reviews the theories supporting my hypotheses, and concludes with my hypotheses; 
Section III describes the design of my experiment including details about the participants, 
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design, and experimental task, as well as the independent and dependent variables; Section 
IV describes the results; and Section V presents the conclusions on this study. 
II. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 The PCAOB requires auditors to appropriately apply professional skepticism 
throughout an audit, including in the areas of identifying and assessing the risk of account 
misstatements and in the evaluation of audit evidence (PCAOB 2012). Furthermore, the 
PCAOB states the objective of the auditor is to plan and perform the audit to obtain 
appropriate audit evidence that is sufficient to support the opinion expressed in the audit 
report (AS 15 2010). The presence of irrelevant information or minor errors should 
seemingly have no impact on an auditor’s assessment of the sufficiency (i.e., the quantity) 
and appropriateness (i.e., the quality) of audit evidence obtained or to be obtained. 
However, as found in Part 1 of this study, the presence of irrelevant information or minor 
errors does indeed raise a red flag for auditors and can lead to an increase in skeptical 
judgment and action. Additionally, in practice, the auditor’s response to dirty records could 
have a material impact on overall audit costs as well as audit effectiveness and subsequent 
legal liability.  
Extant theories on attention, such as cognitive load theory (see Sweller 1988), 
suggest that auditors have a finite mental processing capacity when evaluating audit 
evidence. Therefore, auditors should ideally focus on evidence that is the most relevant to 
performing their task. Prior research on irrelevant information and belief updating (e.g., 
Ashton and Ashton 1988; Shelton 1999), together with this paper’s findings in Part 1, 
suggest that irrelevant information and minor errors can influence auditor decision making. 
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This is especially the expectation if the presence of irrelevant information and minor errors 
dilute the perceived informativeness and salience of the audit evidence.  
 This study examines how auditor students are influenced by the presence of 
irrelevant information and minor errors when evaluating audit evidence. Eye-tracking 
tracking technology is used to observe participants’ search paths, including data elements 
fixated upon, dwell time within areas of interest, and the overall time spent reviewing the 
evidence. Recent eye-tracking studies on decision making find that people fixate and dwell 
on attributes they perceive as the most relevant (Glöckner and Herbold 2011; Kim et al. 
2012; Oliveira et al. 2016). In addition, recent eye-tracking studies investigating dwell 
times find that longer dwell times are associated with higher levels of cognitive processing 
(Velichokovsky 1999; Velichokovsky et al. 2002; Glöckner and Herbold 2011). Therefore, 
based on the results of Experiment 1, the presence of irrelevant information and minor 
errors should result in a longer overall time spent reviewing the evidence, including a 
higher number of fixations and longer dwell times on areas of interest. However, since it 
is largely unknown how dirty records will impact an auditor’s level of attention, I propose 
the following research question: 
RQ1: Does the presence of irrelevant information and/or minor errors result in 
individuals becoming less efficient (i.e., exhibit longer fixations and dwell times) 
while reviewing audit evidence? 
III. METHOD 
Design and Participants 
This study employs a 2 x 2 between-subjects design manipulating the presence of 
irrelevant information in the client documents (i.e., present vs. not present) and whether 
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there are minor errors in the client documents (i.e., errors vs. no errors). The two primary 
dependent variables in this study are the number of fixations and dwell time. This study 
also measures the increase in the participant’s beliefs about account misstatement risk and 
the increase in sample size.  
Graduate and senior undergraduate students currently enrolled in auditing courses 
at a large southeastern university were recruited as participants in this study.15 Students 
were compensated for their participation with extra credit points in their audit class. A total 
of 46 auditing students completed the experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the four treatment conditions. In addition to the Control condition there are three 
other treatment conditions: Treatment 1 - no irrelevant information but containing minor 
errors, Treatment 2 - irrelevant information but with no minor errors, and Treatment 3 - 
both irrelevant information and minor errors are present. 
Tasks and Procedures 
Sona Systems was used to schedule participants for this study. Sona Systems allows 
participants to view the available experiment timeslots online, as well as sends them 
reminders the day before and the day of their lab sessions (Sona Systems 2017). 
Specifically, participants were recruited through an email sent by their audit professors. 
The email included a link to Sona Systems that allowed them to schedule a convenient lab 
time (See Appendix C for a copy of the recruitment email).  
As summarized in Figure 9, upon arriving at the lab, each student participant was 
greeted by one of the experimenters and walked through the consent form line by line (see 
Appendix C for a copy of the consent form). Next, they were given time to review the 
                                                          
15 This study was approved by the Internal Review Board at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
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consent form on their own. Students had to sign-off on the consent form before they could 
proceed. Students who choose not to participate could get the same amount of extra credit 
by completing a similar written assignment. No students chose to complete the alternative 
assignment. After signing the consent form, participants were given a four-digit 
identification number. Random four-digit identification numbers were assigned to each 
participant in order to maintain confidentiality of data. A separate list of student names and 
identification numbers was maintained in case a participant later requested to have their 
data removed from the study. 
Next, the participant was led into the eye-tracking room and seated in front of the 
eye-tracking computer. Participants were given a brief introduction to the eye-tracking 
technology and a brief overview of the experimental task and how to use the computer. 
The Tobii X2-60 eye-tracker was used in this experiment. The technology is unobtrusive 
and attached to the computer monitor. The benefit of the Tobii software is that it allows 
participants to freely sit in front of the computer without having to wear special head gear 
or maintain a specific distance from the monitor. It also has no problem tracking 
participant’s eyes should they momentarily glance away from the monitor. 
Prior to the start of the experiment, participants were calibrated to the eye-tracking 
software. The calibration process required them to visually follow a bouncing ball around 
the computer screen. The calibration process was uneventful accept for one instance where 
heavy eye make-up appeared to interfere with the software’s ability to track the 
participant’s eye movements.  
Following calibration, participants accessed the audit case materials by entering 
their four-digit identification number into the PC (see Appendix C Slides 1-3). The initial 
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slides presented participants with a hypothetical case scenario for them to read through. 
The case scenario had participants assume the role of a staff auditor performing the 
accounts receivable portion of an audit of a hypothetical company called Sprandel, Inc.16 
The case scenario described Sprandel as a mid-sized public company specializing in the 
production of plastic shaped bottles. The case indicated that the audit team assessed the 
inherent risk for the account as being high, and the control risk for the account as being 
low. Thus, the overall risk for the account was described as being moderate.  
Participants were then given the task of assessing the likelihood of account 
misstatement and determining the appropriate sample size. In order to provide a baseline 
for assessing the likelihood of account misstatement, participants were informed that their 
initial estimate of the account being misstated was 20 percent and in prior years the audit 
team selected 10 items to test.  
The next slide contained the audit evidence slide (see Slide 4 in Appendix C). 
Participants could view the audit evidence slide for as long as they desired. The average 
time participants viewed this slide across all four conditions was 55 seconds. Unlike 
Experiment 1 participants were not required to spend any pre-defined length of time on the 
audit evidence slide. After reviewing the case materials and audit evidence, the participant 
clicked on a link that connected them to a Qualtrics survey that allowed them to enter their 
responses for the follow-up assessment. The assessment consisted of questions relating to 
the dependent variables and occurred immediately following the eye-tracking portion in 
order to reduce memory loss.  
                                                          
16 The hypothetical company Sprandel, Inc., is adapted from a teaching case by Andiola, Lambert, and 
Lynch (2017). 
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In order to minimize the size of the eye-tracking data file and to facilitate the most 
efficient use of the eye-tracking computer stations, the participant moved to computer 
station not equipped with the eye-tracking hardware in order to complete the post-
experiment questionnaire. The questionnaire was administered using a second Qualtrics 
survey (See Slide 10 in Appendix C). Each participant entered their four-digit identification 
number at the beginning of each stage of the experiment so that eye-tracking data could be 
linked to the appropriate Qualtrics survey responses.   
[Insert Figure 9 here] 
Independent Variables 
 The first independent variable was the presence of irrelevant information. As shown 
in Appendix C (see Slide 4), this variable was manipulated at two levels (irrelevant 
information present vs. not present). Participants assigned to the irrelevant information 
absent treatment condition were presented with a client document that had no irrelevant 
information. This treatment condition only showed the customer name, invoice number, 
invoice date, and invoice amount. Alternatively, participants assigned to the irrelevant 
information present treatment condition were presented with a document that contained 
irrelevant information in the form of unnecessary columns of information. The unnecessary 
columns contained information on the state the customer is located in, the phone number 
of the customer, the skew code of the items sold, and the name and number of items sold.17 
 The second independent variable examined the presence of minor errors. As shown 
in Appendix C (see Slide 4), this variable was also manipulated at two levels (i.e., minor 
errors present vs. minor errors absent). In the minor errors present treatment condition, 
                                                          
17 Three auditors with public accounting experience verified that the irrelevant information used in this 
study accurately depicts what auditors encounter in practice. 
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participants were presented with client provided audit evidence that contained five minor 
errors (e.g., the total account balance did not tie to the balance sheet, there were minor typo 
errors, and pieces of the information seemed incomplete).18 Participants assigned to the 
minor errors absent treatment condition were presented with a client document that was 
free from errors (i.e., the total account balance tied to the balance sheet, the information 
was complete, and there were no minor typo errors in the information). 
Dependent Variables 
 The two attention-specific dependent variables in this experiment were total 
fixations and dwell time. The first dependent variable, total fixations, is the sum of all 
fixations within an area of interest. Fixation is a term used to describe when someone looks 
at a particular data element or location for an extended period of time (Duchowski 2002). 
Areas of interest (AOI) or regions of interest are areas of visual interest defined by the 
researcher during the experiment (Kim, Seligman, and Kable 2012; Su, Rao, Li, Wang, and 
Li 2012; Ashby and Rakow 2015).  
The second dependent variable is dwell time. Dwell time is a term used to describe 
the sum of fixations in one area before a participant fixates on another area (Bialkova and 
van Trijp 2011). In other words, dwell time captures how long someone fixates on an AOI. 
Panels A, B, C, and D of Figure 10 show the eight AOI’s tested in this study. Across all 
four treatment conditions, AOI’s were created for the Customer column, the Invoice 
Amount column, the Invoice Total area, and the spreadsheet Overall. In the treatment 
conditions with minor errors (i.e., Treatment 1 and Treatment 3) there were four additional 
                                                          
18 In order to verify the types of errors participants noticed and how many were necessary to ensure 
participants noticed them, this instrument was pilot tested with 40 undergraduate auditing students at a 
large southeastern university. 
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AOI’s created for the errors. Specifically, there were AOI’s for the two customer column 
errors, the date error, and the invoice column error. 
[Insert Figure 10 here] 
 Participants also responded to questions relating to dependent variables from 
Experiment 1. Specifically, the increase in the account misstatement likelihood and the 
increase in sample size (see Appendix C Slide 7). The first dependent variable measured 
the increase in the participant’s beliefs about account misstatement risk after encountering 
a clean versus a dirty client document. Consistent with prior studies mentioned earlier in 
the belief updating section (e.g., Ashton and Ashton 1988), participants were given an 
initial estimate in the case description that the likelihood of the account being misstated 
was 20 percent. Subsequently, after being presented with audit evidence that varied across 
participants according to treatment condition, participants rated their beliefs about the 
likelihood of the account being misstated on a scale ranging from 0 percent to 100 percent.  
 The second dependent variable was the participant’s choice of sample size after 
encountering a clean vs a dirty client document. The initial sample size recommended to 
participants was 10 client records based on prior experience with the client. However, after 
reviewing the dirty document, participants were given the opportunity to select a sample 
size from 0 to 30 client records (0 percent to 100 percent of the items displayed). 
Post-Experimental Questionnaire 
 After addressing the dependent variable questions, participants completed a post-
experimental questionnaire. As shown in Appendix C (see Slides 8-16), the post-
experimental questionnaire included one manipulation check question, one debriefing 
question, one attention check question, several demographic questions, and scales 
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measuring skepticism and risk aversion. The manipulation check question verified errors 
were present and asked “Agree or Disagree - The file sent by the client appeared to contain 
potential errors.” The debriefing question assessed whether perceived client competence 
influenced participant responses and asked “Agree or Disagree - Your review of the file 
increased your confidence in the client’s competence.” For both questions, participants 
responded on a seven point Likert scale with 1 representing “strongly disagree” and 7 
representing “strongly agree.” Since the presence of irrelevant information is something 
participants may not be consciously aware of, there was no manipulation check question 
relating to irrelevant information.   
An attention check question was added to the case to verify participants were 
actively reading each question. The attention check question was included as part of the 
Hurtt (2010) skepticism scale (See Appendix C slide 12). Instead of asking participants to 
rate how closely a statement described themselves, this attention check question asked 
participants to “please select strongly disagree for this item.” This verified they were 
actively reading the scale items and not just randomly selecting answers. 
The demographic and experience questions captured student status (i.e., what year 
in school), gender, age, years of professional experience in accounting, other work 
experience, and whether English was their first language. Lastly, participants completed 
the Hurtt (2010) 30 item skepticism scale (See Appendix C slide 11 – 13) and the 6-item 
risk aversion scale from Blais and Weber (2006). The skepticism scale measures skepticism 
using questions such as “I often accept other people’s explanations without further 
thought” or “I am confident in my abilities.” Responses for each item were captured on a 
seven point Likert scale with 1 representing “strongly disagree” and 7 representing 
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“strongly agree.” The risk aversion scale measures risk aversion by asking participants to 
rate on a Likert scale from 1 representing “extremely unlikely” to 7 representing 
“extremely likely” how likely they are to engage in a series of activities. An example of an 
activity is “betting a day’s income at the horse races.” 
Eye-Tracking Apparatus 
 The Tobii X2-60 eye-tracker was the primary input device in this experiment. The 
eye-tracker was connected to the lower portion of a conventional computer monitor. The 
eye-tracker sampled at 60 Hz with an accuracy of 0.4 degrees. One degree of accuracy 
represents 11 millimeters (0.43 inches) on a screen at a distance of 65 centimeters or 26 
inches away from the participant (about the size of a character or 20 pixels on a computer 
screen). Raw eye-tracking data was collected and analyzed using Tobii Pro Studio. 
IV. RESULTS 
Demographics and Covariates 
 A total of 46 students completed the experiment. Three participants were later 
removed because they had an eye-tracking accuracy score of less than 10 percent. Tobii 
accuracy scores are an estimate of how accurately a participant’s eyes were tracked. 
Therefore, 43 students were included in the analyses presented in this section. Of the 43 
total participants, 11 students were in the control condition, 8 were in Treatment 1, 12 in 
Treatment 2, and 12 in Treatment 3. 
Table 10 summarizes the demographic information of the remaining 43 
participants. The majority (76.70 percent) of participants fell within the age range of 21 to 
30, 18.60 percent within the age range of 31 to 40, and 4.70 percent fell within the range 
of 41 to 50. The majority of participants spoke English as a first language (69.80 percent). 
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There were slightly more male than female participants (55.80 percent were male). The 
average years of professional work experience in accounting was 1.18 years, and the 
average years of other work experience was 6.58 years. The most common student status 
was Undergraduate Senior (48.80 percent), followed by 25.60 percent pursuing a Post-
Baccalaureate Certificate, and 25.60 percent in a Master’s program. When these 
demographic variables were added to the analysis as covariates, there was no evidence that 
the variables were significant. Therefore, the demographic variables were not included as 
covariates in subsequent analyses. 
 To determine whether randomization had been achieved, the presence of irrelevant 
information and the presence of minor errors were included as independent variables in a 
MANOVA model, with the demographic variables included as dependent variables. A lack 
of significance was found for all demographic variables. This finding provides some 
evidence that randomization was achieved. 
 [Insert Table 10 here] 
Manipulation Check 
 The manipulation check question addressed the presence of errors using seven point 
Likert response scales with one representing “strongly disagree” and seven representing 
“strongly agree.” The first manipulation check question asked participants “Agree or 
Disagree – The file sent by the client appeared to contain potential errors.” The mean 
response for treatment conditions containing errors was 5.42, and for treatment conditions 
containing no errors the mean was 4.30. There was a significant difference (p < 0.05) 
between treatment conditions with and without errors consistent with a successful 
manipulation of the presence of errors. The 4.30 overall mean for treatment conditions with 
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no errors was probably a result of using the “agree or disagree” type Likert scale for 
responses. Participants who were potentially unsure of whether errors were present or not 
may have selected a neutral response of 4 representing “neither agree nor disagree” to be 
safe. Additionally, the mean response for treatment conditions containing irrelevant 
information was 4.72, and the mean response for treatment conditions without irrelevant 
information was 5.00. There was no significant difference (p > 0.10) between these 
treatment conditions providing evidence that the presence of irrelevant information did not 
influence participant’s perception of errors being present. Thus, the results of the 
manipulation check question indicate that the manipulation of the presence of minor errors 
was successful. 
Client Competence Assessment 
The debriefing question regarding beliefs about client competency asked “Agree or 
Disagree – Your review of the file increased your confidence in the client’s competence.” 
The mean response for treatment conditions containing errors was 3.32, while the mean 
response for treatment conditions not containing errors was 4.40. The difference between 
these values is significant (p < 0.05) suggesting that the presence of minor errors influenced 
participants’ assessments of client competence. In addition, the mean response for 
treatment conditions containing irrelevant information was 3.91, and the mean response 
for treatment conditions not containing irrelevant information was 3.78. The difference 
between these values was not significant (p > 0.10) suggesting that the presence of 
irrelevant information did not influence participant’s assessment of client competence.  
Research Question Analysis  
Heat Maps 
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 Research Question 1 seeks to examine whether the presence of irrelevant 
information or minor errors influences the level of attention participants give to audit 
evidence when evaluating misstatement risk and the appropriate sample size. To examine 
RQ1, a heat map analysis was conducted. Tobii studio creates heat maps based on the time 
spent on each treatment condition (see Figure 11 Panels A-D). The warmer colored areas 
(i.e., the brighter red colored areas) show increased levels of attention where there were 
more fixations and longer dwell times. If there were no differences in attention levels across 
treatment conditions, then we would expect to see similar colors and patterns of colors on 
each heat map.  
As shown in Figure 11, there was a clear difference in the attention levels between 
the various treatment conditions. Based on a visual inspection of the heat maps, it appears 
that the Control condition, which had no irrelevant information or minor errors present 
(Figure 11 Panel A), and Treatment 3, which had both minor errors and irrelevant 
information (Figure 11 Panel D), had the most warm-colored red areas indicating more 
fixations and longer dwell times. Thus, the two extreme treatment conditions seemed to 
draw the most scrutiny. This suggests that audit evidence which is not consistent with the 
auditor’s initial level of anticipated risk of restatement (including a perfectly clean record) 
increases the auditor’s attention level. 
[Insert Figure 11 here] 
 Furthermore, a visual inspection of the heat maps for the Control condition and 
Treatment 2 (which contained irrelevant information without minor errors) is noteworthy. 
There was significantly less attention focused on Treatment 2 than on the Control condition 
(see Figure 11, Panels A and C). This result provides evidence of a dilution effect occurring 
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when irrelevant information was present. In other words, when participants encounter audit 
evidence containing irrelevant information they respond by displaying lower levels of 
attention than they would if no irrelevant information was present. Overall, the results of 
this heat map analysis suggest that attention is influenced by the presence of irrelevant 
information and minor errors. 
One-Way ANOVA Analysis of Overall Differences across Treatment Conditions 
 The primary dependent variables in this experiment were the number of fixations 
and dwell time (see Table 11 for means and standard deviations). To further examine RQ1, 
a one-way analysis of variance was conducted for the overall number of fixations and 
overall dwell time variables. If there were no differences in participant level of attention 
(i.e., number of fixations and dwell time) then there should be no significant differences 
across treatment conditions. As shown in Table 11 Panel A, there was a significant 
difference in fixation counts between treatment conditions (F(3, 39) = 6.15, p < 0.05). 
These results suggest that there were significant differences in the level of attention across 
treatment conditions. 
To further analyze the result for number of fixations, a Tukey post hoc test was 
conducted. Results of the Tukey post hoc test reveal that the Control condition (where 
neither irrelevant information nor minor errors were present) and Treatment 3 (where both 
irrelevant information and minor errors were present) were significantly different from 
each other (p < 0.05). Additionally, Treatment 2 (where irrelevant information was present 
and there were no minor errors) and Treatment 3 (where both irrelevant information and 
minor errors were present) were significantly different from each other (p < 0.01). These 
results confirm that participants had significantly more fixations on audit evidence when 
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both irrelevant information and minor errors were present. Thus, overall the results of these 
tests provide evidence that the presence of irrelevant information or minor errors raises 
attention levels. 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
Table 11 Panel B contains the results for the dwell time. The results for dwell time 
are similar to Panel A. There was a significant overall difference between treatment 
conditions (F(3, 39) = 5.35, p < 0.05). Similar to Panel A this result suggests that 
participants spent different amounts of time viewing the overall spreadsheet depending on 
the presence of irrelevant information or minor errors. To further analyze the dwell time 
results, a Games-Howell post hoc test was conducted. A Games-Howell post hoc test was 
used after a Levene’s test for homogeneity was found to be significant. Therefore, the 
assumption of equal variances could not be assumed. Results of the Games’ Howell post 
hoc test reveal that Treatment 2 (where irrelevant information was present and there were 
no minor errors) was significantly different (p < 0.05) from Treatment 3 (where both 
irrelevant information and minor errors were present). Since irrelevant information was 
present in both of the treatment conditions, this result suggests that participants spent 
significantly more time viewing the audit evidence when minor errors were present 
compared to when there were no minor errors. Overall the one-way ANOVA results 
support the findings of the heat map analysis and provide further evidence that the presence 
of irrelevant information or minor errors can influence how auditors focus their attention. 
Kruskal-Wallace Test 
There are only 8 to 12 participants in each treatment condition. To address the lack 
of power due to small sample sizes the Kruskal-Wallace test was conducted for fixations 
95 
 
and dwell times. The Kruskal-Wallace test is the nonparametric version of the one-way 
ANOVA. Results of the Kruskal-Wallace test are shown in Table 12. Table 12 Panel A 
shows the results for the analysis of fixations. The Kruskal-Wallace test found a significant 
difference (p < 0.05) in the total number of fixations between the four treatment conditions. 
Table 12 Panel B shows the Kruskal-Wallace test for dwell time. Consistent with Panel A, 
there was a significant difference (p < 0.05) in the overall dwell time between the four 
conditions. Overall these results are consistent with the parametric tests above and suggest 
that the number of fixations and overall dwell time by participants significantly varied 
depending on the presence of irrelevant information or minor errors. 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
Supplemental Analysis 
To further investigate the differences in the eye-tracking results across treatment 
conditions an additional mediation analysis was conducted. This additional analysis was 
performed using the Haye’s (2010) PROCESS tool for SPSS to examine the relationship 
between participant level of skepticism, attention in specific areas of interest, and 
assessments of the misstatement likelihood and sample size. See Appendix D for the results 
of these tests. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of Experiment 2 is to utilize eye-tracking technology to examine how 
auditing students react to dirty documents. Eye-tracking is the process of measuring a 
person’s eye activity (iMotion 2016). Specifically, eye-tracking technology allows for a 
more precise investigation of the specific factors focused upon in performing a decision-
making task, as well as the visual search strategy employed. In Experiment 2, auditing 
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students from a large southeastern university assumed the role of staff auditors in the same 
audit scenario as Experiment 1. However, in this experiment, the participant’s eye 
movements were recorded while they reviewed the case materials and audit evidence.  
Results of this experiment showed that participants focused their attention 
differently depending on whether irrelevant information or minor errors were present. In 
addition, eye-tracking offered additional insight into the influence of irrelevant information 
and minor errors. Experiment 1 found no dilution effect when both irrelevant information 
and minor errors were present. However, contrary to the results in Experiment 1, the eye-
tracking results suggest that irrelevant information triggers a dilution effect. In other words, 
when auditors encounter audit evidence containing irrelevant information they respond by 
displaying lower levels of attention than they would if no irrelevant information was 
present. Another insight gained from eye-tracking is that audit evidence which is not 
consistent with the initial level of anticipated risk of restatement (including a perfectly 
clean record) increases the auditor’s attention level.  
 Future researchers could explore whether more experienced auditors or auditors 
scoring high in trait skepticism are found to share a unique but similar scan path and/or 
fixation points while processing a dirty record effectively. If so, audit firms and educators 
can adapt the findings to enhance training in the appropriate application of professional 
skepticism. For example, the results could help develop a preferred analytical framework 
for reading/reviewing/analyzing client records. 
 The results of this study are subject to the same limitations that apply to any 
research that employs a judgment and decision making setting. For example, the results 
may have been different with professional participants. However, researchers have argued 
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that the use of professional participants should be avoided unless they are determined to be 
essential to achieving specific research goals (Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelsen 2002). Given 
that the students were trained to react similarly to professionals in our research scenario, 
and the extensive history of using students in similar tests of economic theory (Smith 
2008), I believe the use of students is appropriate in this setting. Additionally, the lack of 
significant difference in the Hurtt Skepticism scale (2010) scores between the audit 
participants in Experiment 1 and the students in Experiment 2 (see Table 6) provide 
evidence that students were similar to auditors in their levels of trait skepticism. Another 
limitation of this study, is that although it was designed to be realistic, the experimental 
setting was far more simplified than a real-world audit setting. Thus, the responses in both 
experiments may not reflect how auditors would respond in a more complex setting in 
practice. Further, a lack of power with Experiment 2 was certainly a possible limitation in 
interpreting the results for those tests.  
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Appendix A 
Associated Materials Overview 
 
Online Instrument  
 
Screen 1 – IRB Information and Consent Sheet 
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Screens 2 - 5 – Screening Questions (participants that answered the questions below 
incorrectly were removed from the study) 
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Screen 6 – Case Description 
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Screen 7 – Key Information Quiz (participants had to select the correct answer to proceed) 
 
 
 
 
 
Screen 8 – Task Reminder Screen 
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Screen 9 - Audit Evidence Screen (1 of the following 4 is randomly shown to participants) 
 
Control Condition (no irrelevant information or minor errors): 
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Treatment 1 (minor errors and no irrelevant information): 
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Treatment 2 (irrelevant information and no minor errors): 
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Treatment 3 (both irrelevant information and minor errors): 
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Screen 10 – Follow-up Assessment Questions 
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Screen 11 – Follow-up Assessment Questions Continued 
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Screen 12 – Attention Check Question (participants had to get this question correct to 
continue) 
 
 
 
 
Screen 13 – Post-Experimental Debrief Survey 
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Screen 14 – Post-Experimental Debrief Survey Continued 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
139 
 
Screen 15 – Demographic Questions 
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Screens 16 - 18 – Skepticism Survey (Hurtt 2010) 
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142 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
143 
 
Screen 19 – Final Demographic Information 
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Appendix B 
Responses to the Open-Ended Question 
 
“Typical Shoebox, just trying to drill down to the necessary information. Clients either 
send too much or not enough.” 
 
“Loan files from a client were in a huge basket and they were not organized. They told us 
to find everything on our own.” 
 
“I've received literal shoeboxes of unorganized paperwork.” 
 
“Request the client "refurbish" the files provided and prepare better organized 
workpapers and source documents.  Most of our clients are quite small and have limited 
staff.” 
 
“Irrelevant information, major errors in estimates” 
 
“Client provided trial balance prior to making any adjusting entries that they knew 
needed to be made.” 
 
“Details did not agree to the trial balance. Several entries had to be made.” 
 
“We have a bookkeeper for several small clients that keeps files in milk crates.” 
 
“Tax client who was personal assistant that hadn't filed for 3 years. Spent several days 
just sorting receipts into personal and business by year. Huge waste of time.” 
 
“Not recording revenues in the appropriate month” 
 
“Needed to be completely resubmitted due to not following directions. Materially 
incomplete.” 
 
“Shoe box no longer client” 
 
“Sub-ledgers did not tie to general ledger 
 
“Many out of period transactions” 
 
“Minor errors” 
 
“Errors and messy” 
 
“A box of invoices that had never been entered” 
 
“Go percentage was higher than expected. On examination returned good were placed 
back in inventory without the sale being reversed” 
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“Beginning retained earning doesn't tie to prior year” 
 
“Received a file that had no date order, missing documents” 
 
“Home builder not using the percentage-of-completion method for costs.” 
 
“Doesn't agree to GL” 
 
“Partner helped with notes receivable” 
 
“We have audited companies with false amounts and merchandise with different faults” 
 
“Was a Japanese client and [they] had many unneeded columns for our audit work.” 
 
“I uncovered a suspicious amount of open invoices to one single customer. It represented 
about 30% of the total A/R. It turned out to be an entity related to the owner's family, and 
should have been considered an owner's distribution, rather than a sale.” 
 
“Irrelevant information with many minor and some major errors.” 
 
“Client Quickbokks file consisted of journalist entries and no detail information and did 
not reconcile” 
 
“Client updated to a new software and we had to reformat and piecemeal files to meet our 
audit requirements” 
 
“[Client files were] Not agreed to GL” 
 
“Having files that are not of year-end, so numbers are just slightly off”  
 
“When the client throws everything (and I mean everything) into a box and brings it to 
you.” 
 
“A client was using quickbooks without any prior training and his books were almost 
completely unusable.” 
 
“I'm a CPA and have been in public accounting for my whole working career of 5 years 
and have only done tax.  Certainly, there are many times were I receive client prepared 
financial statements in which there have been no attestation services performed and I 
have to do many adjusting journal entries for the client to properly prepare the 
financials.” 
 
“Client hadn't completed bank reconciliations from May through the end of the year.” 
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Appendix C 
Eye-Tracking Associated Materials Overview 
Recruitment Email: 
 
Greetings, 
 
Would you be interested in participating in a 15-20 minute auditor research study here at VCU? If so, we 
invite you to participate in a study at the School of Business about how auditors respond to different client 
documents. 
 
As a currently enrolled auditing student age 18 or older, you are uniquely qualified to participate in this 
research study. 
 
The purpose of this study is to improve auditing students' learning and understanding of key auditing 
concepts through the application of class concepts to a real world audit setting. Specifically, you will be 
asked to review audit evidence and perform audit tasks based on your professional judgment while your 
eye movements are being tracked. 
 
For participating in this study you will receive 5 opportunity points. 
Here's how to participate: 
Step 1. Click on the link below to schedule a date and time for your 20-minute research session. (Please 
note, there is limited space to participate in this research study. Sign-ups for the study are on a first-come, 
first-serve basis) 
Step 2. Details about the research session, including what to bring and where to go will be emailed to you 
before your session. 
Step 3. Attend your scheduled research session. 
 
CLICK HERE TO SIGN UP: https://vcu-celab.sona-systems.com/Default.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2f 
 
If you have any questions, complaints, or concerns about the research, contact Alisa Brink (804) 828-
7117 or agbrink@vcu.edu. 
 
Note - Alternatively, you can also receive the same opportunity points by completing a homework 
assignment on your own (see your instructor for a copy of the homework assignment) and turning in a 2-3 
page written response to your instructor. The homework assignment requires you to read an audit scenario 
and respond to a list of case questions. 
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Consent Form: 
RESEARCH SUBJECT INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM 
 
TITLE: The Accounts Receivable Sample Selection Case 
VCU IRB NO.: HM20009511   
INVESTIGATORS: Alisa Brink, Ph.D., Jodie Ferguson Ph.D., Lindsay Andiola Ph.D., and Edward Lynch 
CPA 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY  
The purpose of this study is to better understand how auditors respond to different client documents.  You 
are being asked to participate in this study to find out if audit students react differently depending on the 
attributes of audit evidence. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AND YOUR INVOLVEMENT 
If you decide to participate in this research study, you will be asked to sign this consent form after you have 
had all your questions answered and understand what will happen to you. 
In this study, you will be asked to sit at a regular computer desk that has an eye tracking device attached to 
it. You will be asked to review some audit evidence provided by a fictitious client, and make some 
judgements. As you read the information on the computer screen, your eye gaze location on the computer 
screen will be measured.  Only your eye movements will be tracked and no actual video of your eyes or 
your face will be recorded.  Your participation in the study should take about 15 minutes.   
RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
The eye tracking equipment used in this study is not attached to you and does not pose any danger to you 
physically. There is also a risk of loss of confidentiality or privacy. There are no risks involved with 
participating in this research beyond what is experienced in everyday life. 
BENEFITS TO YOU AND OTHERS 
You may not get any direct benefit from this study, but the information we learn in this study could help us 
to better understand how audit students evaluate audit evidence. 
COSTS 
There are no costs for participating in this study beyond the time for you to participate in the research. 
 
PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION 
Students will receive five extra credit points for their participation in this study. Those students who wish 
not to participate will have the opportunity to complete an equivalent task for the same amount of extra 
credit. The equivalent task will involve students analyzing a similar case on their own and writing up a 
typed response to the case questions and turning it into their professors. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Your identifiable information, such as your name, will be separate from your responses.  
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We will not share the responses you give us; however, information from the study and the consent form 
signed by you may be looked at or copied for research or legal purposes by Virginia Commonwealth 
University. Records may also be accessed by the Office of Human Research Protections (OHRP).  
The research findings may be presented at meetings or published in papers, but your name will not ever be 
used in these presentations or papers. 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
Your participation in this study is voluntary.  You may decide to not participate in this study.  Your 
decision not to take part will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  In 
addition, your decision to participate will not affect your grade or academic standing. If you do participate, 
you may freely withdraw from the study at any time.  Your decision to with draw will involve no penalty or 
loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. 
Your participation in this study may be stopped at any time by the study staff without your consent. The 
reasons might include: 
 the study staff thinks it necessary for your health or safety; 
 you have not followed study instructions; or 
 administrative reasons require your withdrawal. 
 
If you leave the study before the data collection is complete, your data will be removed from the analysis. If 
after you leave the study, you still may have your information removed from the study up to one month 
after your participation in this study. To have your information removed after you leave, please email or 
call Dr. Brink at agbrink@vcu.edu or (804)828-7117. 
QUESTIONS 
If you have any questions, complaints, or concerns about your participation in this research, contact: 
 
Alisa Brink, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor of Accounting 
Virginia Commonwealth University 
Email: agbrink@vcu.edu 
Phone: (804) 828-7117 
 
The researcher named above is the best person to call for questions about your participation in this study.  
 
If you have any general questions about your rights as a participant in this or any other research, you may 
contact: 
 
 Office of Research 
 Virginia Commonwealth University 
 800 East Leigh Street, Suite 3000 
 P.O. Box 980568 
 Richmond, VA  23298 
 Telephone: (804) 827-2157 
 
Contact this number to ask general questions, to obtain information or offer input, and to express concerns 
or complaints about research. You may also call this number if you cannot reach the research team or if you 
wish to talk with someone else.  General information about participation in research studies can also be 
found at  
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http://www.research.vcu.edu/human_research/volunteers.htm. 
 
CONSENT 
I have been given the chance to read this consent form. I understand the information about this study. 
Questions that I wanted to ask about the study have been answered. My signature says that I am willing to 
participate in this study.  I will receive a copy of the consent form once I have agreed to participate. 
 
 
Participant name printed   Participant signature  Date 
 
 
________________________________________________ 
Name of Person Conducting Informed Consent Discussion 
(Printed) 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Signature of Person Conducting Informed Consent Discussion Date 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Principal Investigator Signature (if different from above)   Date  
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Eye-Tracking Slides: 
Slide 1: Welcome Screen 
 
Slide 2 & 3: Task Outline Screens 
 
151 
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Slide 4: Audit Evidence Slide (1 of the following 4 is randomly shown to participants) 
 
Control Condition (no irrelevant information or minor errors): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
153 
 
Treatment 1 (minor errors and no irrelevant information): 
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Treatment 2 (irrelevant information and no minor errors): 
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Treatment 3 (both irrelevant information and minor errors): 
 
 
 
Slide 5: Qualtrics Survey Link 
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Slides 6 – 9: Part 2 Follow-up Assessment Questions in Qualtrics 
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Slides 10 – 16: Part 3 Follow-up Survey in Qualtrics 
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Slide 11 – 13: Hurt (2010) Skepticism Scale Slides 
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Slide 14: Risk Aversion Scale 
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Slide 15 – 16: Demographic Questions 
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Appendix D 
Eye-Tracking Mediation Analysis 
To further investigate the eye-tracking results from Experiment 2, a moderated 
mediation regression exploratory analysis was conducted using Haye’s (2012) PROCESS 
macro for SPSS. Consistent with Experiment 1, to measure participant skepticism the 30 
item Hurtt (2010) scale was used. As shown in Table 5, the average skepticism score for 
participants in this experiment was 76.65.19 The scores of the student participants were not 
significantly different (F(1, 58) = 0.39, p > 0.10) from the scores of the experienced 
accountants used in Experiment 1. Furthermore, the scores for Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2 were very similar to the two samples of auditors surveyed in Hurtt (2010).20 
This finding provides further evidence that students are a good proxy for professionals in 
laboratory settings. 
The moderated mediation model tested the direct effect of skepticism on the 
outcome variables from Experiment 1 (i.e., the likelihood of misstatement and the increase 
in sample size). It also tested the mediating effect of the variables Total Fixations, Dwell 
Time, Time to First Fixation, and Fixations Before on the relationship between irrelevant 
information, minor errors, and skepticism on the outcome variables. Time to first fixation 
measures the time a participant spends reviewing the file before fixating on a specific AOI 
(Schotter et al. 2010; Schotter, Gerety, and Rayner 2012). While fixations before measures 
the number of fixations a participant makes before they reach a specific AOI (See Table 
                                                          
19 The consistency of trait skepticism scores was tested across the four treatment conditions using a one-
way ANOVA. No significant differences were noted (p > 0.10). This suggests that the average trait 
skepticism score of participants was constant across the four treatment conditions, and that viewing 
different manipulations did not inadvertently bias skepticism scale scores. 
20 Auditors surveyed in Hurtt (2010) scored a 75 on one occasion and a 77 on another occasion. 
165 
 
13 for means and standard deviations). These variables help determine the order in which 
AOI’s were examined by participants. In addition, they help determine the importance and 
prominence of AOI’s to participants. If participants focus on one AOI earlier than another, 
the AOI first focused upon most likely drew their attention for a specific reason or they 
deemed that area to be important. 
 
TABLE 13 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Time to First Fixation and Number of Fixations 
Before Across Variables  
Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation) Time to First Fixation   
 Treatment Condition  
AOId Controla Errorsb Irrl_Infoc 
Both Irrl_Info 
and Errors 
 
Customer Column 3.84 (6.99)     1.51 (2.25)   8.89 (11.19)    2.53 (3.23)  
Invoice Column 5.81 (4.07)     2.95 (1.65) 17.55 (25.62) 20.05 (26.75)  
Cust. Col. Error 1  27.49 (18.02)  27.22 (20.28)  
Cust. Col. Error 2  22.42 (17.36)  39.95 (21.37)  
Date Error  37.07 (11.23)  48.09 (13.64)  
Invoice Error  24.33 (14.85)  44.97 (25.14)  
Totals 7.33 (6.31)     2.40 (1.27) 18.99 (30.59) 25.11 (38.20)  
N 11 8 12 12  
Panel B: Mean (Standard Deviation) Number of Fixations Before 
 
 Treatment Condition  
AOI Control Errors Irrl_Info 
Both Irrl_Info 
and Errors 
 
Customer Column    5.27 (8.36)       3.25 (5.12) 10.64 (14.83)      4.42 (3.78)  
Invoice Column  11.91 (7.89)       8.00 (5.90) 15.27 (11.17)   51.08 (48.14)  
Cust. Col. Error 1    75.20 (51.96)    79.56 (68.47)  
Cust. Col. Error 2    74.60 (52.26)  129.87 (74.61)  
Date Error  117.75 (49.69)  138.33 (28.54)  
Invoice Error    79.50 (52.83)  120.57 (28.93)  
Totals 19.90 (19.99)       7.14 (5.81) 17.56 (22.28)  67.45 (110.21)  
N 11 8 12 12  
Notes: 
a Control represents the treatment condition with no irrelevant information or minor errors were present. 
b Errors is an independent variable at two levels, where in the first level minor errors are not present, and in the 
second minor level errors are present. 
c Irrl_Info is an independent variable with two levels, where in the first level irrelevant information is not present, 
and in the second level irrelevant information is present. 
dAOI represents Area of Interest. 
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The PROCESS macro in SPSS works similar to path analysis, in that it provides an 
analysis of moderated mediation, including covariates, in an integrated conditional process 
model (Hayes 2012). The analysis included three experimental factors and one mediator. 
The PROCESS boot-strap model was set to 5,000 samples. PROCESS models 4, 5, 7, 8, 
14, and 15 were examined for each of the common AOI variables (i.e., Customer Column, 
Invoice Column, Totals area). Table 14 and Figure 12 shows the results of the PROCESS 
Model 4 for the fixations before variable. Prior literature suggests more skeptical people 
should spend more time reviewing the audit evidence (Hurtt et al. 2013). Therefore, longer 
dwell times should be associated with the outcome variables. Therefore, a simple mediation 
model (PROCESS model 4) was tested first to see if mediation was present before testing 
the more complicated models. As shown in Table 14 mediation was not present in any of 
the models examining the fixations before variable. However, as shown in Table 15, when 
dwell time was tested as a mediating variable, partial mediation was present when sample 
size was used the dependent variable (coeffskepticism = 0.18, p = 0.04 and coeffinvoicecol = 0.25, 
p = 0.07). This suggests that the trait skepticism of participants is related to both their dwell 
time on the invoice column as well as their assessment of the appropriate sample size. In 
other words, people higher in trait skepticism are more likely to spend more time dwelling 
on the invoice column in the audit evidence and select large sample sizes. 
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FIGURE 12 
Experiment 2 Skepticism Analysis (PROCESS Model 4) 
 
 
 
Note:  
a Skepticism is the continuous variable for skepticism measured using the Hurtt (2010) skepticism scale. 
b Invoice column represents dwell time around the area of interest for the invoice column in the 
spreadsheet. 
c Sample size represents the increase in the number of items selected for sampling.  
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 (all p-values are two tailed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Skepticisma Sample Sizec 
Invoice 
Columnb 
0.25* 0.16* 
0.18** (0.18**) 
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TABLE 14 
Experiment 2 Mediation Model Results (PROCESS Model 4) 
 
Panel A – Fixations Before Customer Column    
  Misstatementa Sample Sizeb   
  X to M Direct Effect X to M Direct Effect   
(Constant)   19.99 (12.43)  20.06 (33.71)  19.98 (12.43) -3.31 (6.63)   
Skepticismc  -0.18 (0.16)  0.34 (0.43) -0.18 (0.16)  0.21 (0.08)   
Customer Col.   -0.29 (0.42)  -0.08 (0.08)   
R-sq   0.03  0.04  0.03  0.18   
MSE   89.63  0.68  89.63  23.88   
F(df1, df2)   1.23 (1,38)  0.69 (2,37)  1.23 (1,38)  3.97 (2,37)   
Panel B – Fixations Before Totals AOI    
  Misstatement Sample Size   
  X to M Direct Effect X to M Direct Effect   
(Constant)  56.69 (90.13) -0.53 (31.86)  56.69 (90.13) -6.98 (5.86)   
Skepticism  -0.31 (1.17)  0.56 (0.41) -0.31 (1.17)  0.25 (0.08)**   
Totals AOI    0.04 (0.06)   0.01 (0.01)   
R-sq  0.00  0.07  0.00  0.27   
MSE  4520.57  558.30  4520.57  18.94   
F(df1, df2)  0.07 (1,33)  1.12 (2,32)  0.07 (1,33)  5.80 (2,32)**   
Panel C – Fixations Before Invoice Column    
  Misstatement Sample Size   
  X to M Direct Effect X to M Direct Effect   
(Constant)  -66.53 (40.55) 19.73 (33.29) -66.53 (40.55) -4.01 (6.63)   
Skepticism   1.18 (0.53)** 0.28 (0.44)  1.18 (0.53)**  0.21 (0.09)**   
Invoice Col.    0.14 (0.13)   0.02 (0.02)   
R-sq   0.12 0.06  0.12 0.19   
MSE   941.18 592.67  941.18 23.50   
F(df1, df2)   5.03 (1,38)** 1.17 (2,37)  5.03 (1,38)** 4.24 (2,37)**  
        
Notes: 
a Misstatement likelihood was the dependent variable in these models. 
b Increase in sample size was the dependent variable in these models. 
c Skepticism is a continuous variable based on participants’ scores on the Hurtt (2010) skepticism scale. 
* and ** denote a significance at the 0.10 and 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
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TABLE 15 
Experiment 2 Mediation Model Results (PROCESS Model 4) 
 
Panel A – Dwell Time on the Customer Column    
  Misstatementa Sample Sizeb   
  X to M Direct Effect X to M Direct Effect   
(Constant)  -3.14 (7.92) 16.31 (32.50) -3.14 (7.92) -4.28 (6.29)   
Skepticismc   0.11 (0.10) 0.34 (0.43)  0.11 (0.10)  0.20 (0.08)   
Customer Col.    0.31 (0.66)   0.15 (0.13)   
R-sq   0.03 0.03  0.03  0.19    
MSE   36.57 612.89  36.57  23.02   
F(df1, df2)   1.21 (1,39) 0.51 (2,38)  1.21 (1,39)  4.33 (2,38)   
Panel B – Dwell Time on Totals AOI    
  Misstatement Sample Size   
  X to M Direct Effect X to M Direct Effect   
(Constant)  -1.02 (1.75)  10.95 (31.76) -1.02 (1.75) -3.98 (6.28)   
Skepticism   0.03 (0.02)  0.51 (0.42)  0.03 (0.02)  0.19 (0.08)   
Totals AOI   -4.30 (2.88)   0.74 (0.57)   
R-sq   0.05  0.08  0.05  0.19   
MSE   1.79  582.47  1.79  22.79   
F(df1, df2)   1.98 (1,39)  1.53 (2,38)  1.98 (1,39)  4.55 (2,38)*   
Panel C – Dwell Time on the Invoice Column    
  Misstatement Sample Size   
  X to M Direct Effect X to M Direct Effect   
(Constant)  -6.87 (32.62) 19.14 (32.62) -6.87 (32.62) -3.06 (6.19)   
Skepticism   0.16 (0.09)* 0.29 (0.43)  0.16 (0.09)*  0.18 (0.8)**   
Invoice Col.   0.55 (0.69)    0.25 (0.13)*   
R-sq    0.07 0.04  0.7  0.23   
MSE   32.17 606.42  32.17  21.83   
F(df1, df2)   2.93 (1,39)* 0.72(2,38)  2.93 (1,39)*  5.59 (2,38)**   
        
Notes: 
a Misstatement likelihood was the dependent variable in these models. 
b Increase in sample size was the dependent variable in these models. 
c Skepticism is a continuous variable based on participants’ scores on the Hurtt (2010) skepticism scale. 
* and ** denote a significance at the 0.10 and 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
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Since the results indicate trait skepticism is most related to the dwell time and 
sample size outcome variable, PROCESS model 5 was tested to see whether the presence 
of minor errors or irrelevant information acts a moderator in the model. As shown in Table 
15 and Figure 13, consistent with model 4 above, there were no significant results for the 
customer column and totals AOI variables. However, full mediation was found to be 
present for the invoice column AOI variable for both minor errors and irrelevant 
information. In other words, the direct effect relationship between trait skepticism and 
sample size was significant until the variable for dwell time for the invoice column was 
included as an indirect path in the model. Then the direct effect of skepticism on sample 
size was no longer significant. These results extend the findings from model 4 above, and 
suggest that when minor errors or irrelevant information are present the amount of time 
spent dwelling on the invoice column explains the sample size selected by participants. In 
other words, more skeptical people spend more time carefully reviewing the document, 
and subsequently select a larger sample size. 
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TABLE 16 
Experiment 2 Mediation Model Results (PROCESS Model 5) 
 
Panel A – Dwell Time on the Customer Column (DV = Sample Size) 
  Minor Errorsa Irrelevant Informationb 
  X to M Direct Effect X to M Direct Effect 
(Constant)  -3.14 (7.92) -0.64 (9.33) -3.14 (7.92)  7.95 (10.79) 
Skepticismc   0.11 (0.10)  0.16 (0.12)  0.11 (0.10)  0.06 (0.14) 
Customer Col.    0.16 (0.13)   0.16 (0.12) 
Moderator   -8.64 (13.27)  -18.40 (13.25) 
Intercept    0.10 (0.17)   0.22 (0.17) 
R-sq   0.03  0.20  0.03  0.24 
MSE   36.57  36.57  36.57  22.66 
F(df1, df2)   1.21 (1,39)  1.21 (1,39)*  1.21 (1,39)  2.85 (4,36)* 
Panel B – Dwell Time on the Totals AOI (DV = Sample Size) 
  Minor Errors Irrelevant Information 
  X to M Direct Effect X to M Direct Effect 
(Constant)  -1.02 (1.75) -2.95 (9.35) -1.02 (1.75)  6.78 (10.75) 
Skepticism   0.03 (0.02)  0.18 (0.12)  0.03 (0.02)  0.07 (0.14) 
Totals AOI     0.78 (0.61)    0.67 (0.58) 
Moderator   -4.41 (13.47)  -16.36 (13.21)  
Intercept    0.05 (0.18)   0.20 (0.17) 
R-sq   0.5  0.20  0.5  0.24 
MSE   1.79  23.83  1.79  22.79 
F(df1, df2)   1.97 (1,39)  2.27 (4,36)  1.97 (1,39)  2.77 (4,36)** 
Panel C – Dwell Time on the Invoice Column (DV = Sample Size)  
  Minor Errors Irrelevant Information 
  X to M Direct Effect X to M Direct Effect 
(Constant)  -6.87 (7.43) -1.72 (9.04) -6.87 (7.43)  10.59 (10.63) 
Skepticism   0.16 (0.09)*  0.17 (0.12)  0.16 (0.09)*  0.01 (0.14) 
Invoice Col.    0.28 (12)*   0.26 (0.13)* 
Moderator   -5.09 (12.92)  -20.44 (12.94) 
Intercept    0.05 (0.17)   0.25 (0.17) 
R-sq   0.7  0.25  0.7  0.28 
MSE   32.17  22.52  32.17  21.35 
F(df1, df2)   2.93 (1,39)*  2.93 (1,39)**  2.93 (1,39)*  3.57 (4,36)** 
     
Notes: 
a The dichotomous variable for minor errors was the moderator in these models. 
b The dichotomous variable for irrelevant information was the moderator in these models. 
c Skepticism is a continuous variable based on participants’ scores on the Hurtt (2010) skepticism scale. 
* and ** denote a significance at the 0.10 and 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
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FIGURE 13 
Experiment 2 Skepticism Analysis (PROCESS Model 5) 
 
Panel A: Increase in Misstatement Likelihood  
 
Panel B: Increase in Sample Size 
 
 
 
 
Note:  
a Skepticism is the continuous variable for skepticism measured using the Hurtt (2010) skepticism scale. 
b Invoice column represents dwell time around the area of interest for the invoice column in the 
spreadsheet. 
c Sample size represents the increase in the number of items selected for sampling. 
d Represents the independent variable at two levels, where in the first level minor errors are not present, 
and in the second minor level errors are present. 
e Represents the independent variable with two levels, where in the first level irrelevant information is 
not present, and in the second level irrelevant information is present. 
 *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 (all p-values are two tailed) 
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173 
 
Appendix E 
Tables and Figures 
 
TABLE 1 
Experiment 1 Participant Demographic Information 
(number of respondents: n = 97) 
 
Age       
   21 – 30     32%  
   31 – 40     26%  
   41 – 50     16%  
   51+     27%  
Is English your first language?    
   Yes     93%  
   No 
   No response 
    6% 
1% 
 
Gender       
   Female     56%  
   Male     44%  
Years of Work Experience in Public Accounting   
   Mean     9.60  
   Std. Dev.     9.72  
Years of Professional Experience    
   Mean     8.58  
   Std. Dev.     10.33  
Certifications*       
   CPA     71%  
   CIA     4%  
   CFE     4%  
   CMA     4%  
   Other     14%  
   None     17%  
What type of public accounting firms have you worked for?   
   Big 4 (or equivalent at the time) 27%  
   Second tier accounting firm (e.g., BDO or McGladrey & Pullen) 26%  
   Regional accounting firm 28%  
   Local accounting firm 47%  
Note:  
*Participants could select multiple certifications, so that section does not add up to 100 
percent. 
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TABLE 2 
Participant Responses to Debriefing Questions 
(number of respondents: n = 97) 
 
1. Agree or Disagree – your review of the file increased your confidence in the 
client’s competence. 
  
  Mean with errors (Std. Dev.) 2.52 (1.28) 
  Mean without errors (Std. Dev.) 4.04 (1.16) 
2. How often do you or your audit team encounter messy or dirty audit files 
from clients (e.g., records that include irrelevant information, disorganized 
information, and/or minor errors)? 
  
                 Mean  4.24  
                 Std. Dev.  1.34  
3. Agree or Disagree – Client files that are messy/dirty impact my application 
of professional skepticism. 
  
                Mean   5.36  
                Std. Dev.   1.16  
4. Agree or Disagree – Messy/dirty documents provided by the client can 
influence the application of professional skepticism by other members of 
my audit team. 
  
                Mean   5.22  
                Std. Dev.   1.21  
5. On average, how much of your time on a client site is spent cleaning up 
messy/dirty documents? 
  
                Mean   32%  
                Std. Dev.   18%  
Note: 
Question 1 had a range of 1 – 7 with 1 = “strongly disagree” and 7 = “strongly agree” 
Question 2 had a range of 1 – 7 with 1 = “never” and 7 = “all the time” 
Question 3 and 4 had a range of 1 – 7 with 1 = “strongly disagree and 7 = “strongly disagree” 
Question 5 had a range of options from 0 – 100 with 0 percent = “none of your time” and 100 percent = 
“all of your time” 
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TABLE 3 
Means and Standard Deviations for Misstatement Likelihood and Sample Size  
 
Panel A: Mean (Std. Deviation) for Change in Misstatement Likelihooda 
  Irrelevant Informationc    
Errorsd  Absent 
 
Present  Total  
No Errors 
Present 
 16.52 (15.91) 
n = 23 
 23.00 (21.82) 
n = 24 
 19.83 (19.24) 
 n = 47 
 
        
Errors 
Present 
 26.93 (26.82) 
n = 29 
 35.14 (28.59) 
n = 21 
 30.38 (27.60) 
n = 50 
 
        
Total  22.33 (23.06) 
n = 52 
 28.67 (25.66) 
n = 45 
   
 
Panel B: Mean (Std. Deviation) for Change in Sample Sizeb  
  Irrelevant Information    
Errors  Absent 
 
Present  Total 
 
No Errors 
Present 
 1.82 (3.79) 
n = 23 
 3.17 (5.74) 
n = 24 
 2.51 (4.88) 
 n = 47 
 
        
Errors 
Present 
 3.17 (3.12) 
n = 29 
 5.76 (4.43) 
n = 21 
 4.26 (3.90) 
n = 50 
 
Total  2.58 (3.47) 
n = 52 
 4.38 (5.28) 
n = 45 
   
        
Notes: 
a The change from the initial misstatement estimate of 20 percent (ranging from 0 percent to 100 
percent).  
b The change from the initial sample size of 10 items (ranging from 0 to 30 items). 
cIrrelevant Information = 0 if no irrelevant information is present, 1 if irrelevant information is present. 
dErrors = 0 if no minor errors are present, 1 if minor errors are present. 
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TABLE 4 
Multivariate Analysis of Variance for the Increase in Misstatement Likelihood 
and Increase in Sample Size as a Function of the Presence of Irrelevant 
Information and the Presence of Minor Errors  
Source 
Dependent 
Variable 
d
f 
MS F p-valuee η2 
       
  Irrl_Infoc Percent Increasea 1 1290.301 5.332 0.136 0.024 
 Sample Increaseb 1 92.892 4.940 0.029 0.050 
  Errorsd Percent Increase 1 3041.014 5.332 0.023 0.054 
 Sample Increase 1 92.892 4.969 0.028 0.051 
  Irrl_Info* 
  Errors  
Percent Increase 1 17.969 0.032 0.859 0.000 
 Sample Increase 1 9.326 0.499 0.482 0.005 
  Error Percent Increase 9
3 
570.281    
 Sample Increase 9
3 
18.694    
Notes: 
a The percent increase in the likelihood of account misstatement. 
b The increase in the number of items selected for sampling. 
c Irrl_Info is an independent variable with two levels, where in the first level irrelevant information is 
not present, and in the second level irrelevant information is present. 
d Errors is an independent variable at two levels, where in the first level minor errors are not present, 
and in the second minor level errors are present. 
eAll p-values are two-tailed. 
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TABLE 5 
Hurtt (2010) Scale Responses 
 
Exp. 1        Exp. 2        
Scale Item 
Mean 
Score  
(std. dev.) 
Mean Score 
(std. dev.) 
1. I often accept other people’s explanation without further thought. 5.06 (1.34) 5.35 (1.31) 
2. I feel good about myself 5.72 (0.89) 5.77 (1.07) 
3. I wait to decide on issues until I can get more information 5.62 (0.91) 5.79 (0.94) 
4. The prospect of learning excites me. 5.73 (0.84) 5.91 (1.04) 
5. I am interested in what causes people to behave the way they do. 5.70 (1.05) 6.00 (1.16) 
6. I am confident in my abilities 5.75 (1.02) 5.72 (1.12) 
7. I often reject statements unless I have proof they are true. 4.85 (1.05) 5.09 (1.27) 
8. Discovering new information is fun. 5.76 (0.77) 6.21 (0.83) 
9. I take my time when making decisions. 5.66 (0.85) 5.56 (1.16) 
10. I tend to immediately accept what other people tell me. 5.16 (1.15) 5.26 (1.35) 
11. Other people’s behavior does not interest me. 5.08 (1.14) 4.91 (1.17) 
12. I am self-assured. 5.32 (0.99) 5.19 (1.24) 
13. My friends tell me that I usually question things that I see or hear. 4.70 (1.26) 4.70 (1.37) 
14. I like to understand the reason for other people’s behavior. 5.56 (0.96) 5.60 (1.26) 
15. I think that learning is exciting. 5.72 (0.94) 6.00 (0.93) 
16. I usually accept things I see. 4.54 (1.23) 4.51 (1.40) 
17. I do not feel sure of myself. 5.41 (1.32) 5.67 (1.29) 
18. I usually notice inconsistencies in explanations. 5.16 (1.13) 4.93 (1.47) 
19. Most often I agree with what others in my group think. 4.08 (1.09) 3.98 (1.44) 
20. I dislike having to make decisions quickly. 4.87 (1.31) 5.00 (1.27) 
21. I have confidence in myself. 5.66 (1.20) 5.81 (1.01) 
22. I do not like to decide until I’ve looked at all of the readily 
available information. 
5.55 (0.96) 5.74 (0.76) 
23. I like searching for knowledge. 5.55 (0.96) 5.72 (1.08) 
24. I frequently question things I see or hear. 5.23 (0.93) 5.28 (1.16) 
25. It is easy for other people to convince me.  4.66 (1.09) 4.63 (1.33) 
26. I seldom consider why people behave in a certain way. 5.08 (1.23) 4.67 (1.61) 
27. I like to ensure that I’ve considered most available information 
before making a decision. 
5.58 (0.86) 5.84 (0.89) 
28. I enjoy trying to determine if what I read or hear is true. 5.19 (1.00) 5.42 (1.18) 
29. I relish learning. 5.37 (1.05) 5.37 (1.46) 
30. The actions people take and reasons for those actions are 
fascinating. 
5.40 (1.01) 5.33 (1.25) 
Total: 75.58 (7.44) 76.65 (9.23) 
n: 97 43 
Note: 
Exp. 1 refers to Experiment 1, while Exp. 2 refers to Experiment 2. 
The means from Experiment 1 and 2 were not significantly different from one another (p > 0.10). 
Each item had a scale of responses ranging from 1 representing “strongly disagree” to 7 “strongly 
agree.” 
Items 1, 10, 11, 16, 17, 19, 25, 26 are reverse coded when scoring. 
Auditors surveyed in Hurtt (2010) scored a 75 on one occasion and a 77 on another occasion. 
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TABLE 6 
Multivariate Analysis of Variance for the Increase in Misstatement Likelihood 
and Increase in Sample Size as a Function of the Presence of Irrelevant 
Information and the Presence of Minor Errors and Level of Skepticism  
Source 
Dependent 
Variable 
df MS F p-valuef η2 
       
  Irrl_Infoc Percent Increasea 1 1282.088 2.193 0.142 0.024 
 Sample Increaseb 1 91.646 4.414 0.031 0.051 
  Errorsd Percent Increase 1 3041.014 5.332 0.038 0.047 
 Sample Increase 1 92.892 4.969 0.058 0.040 
  Skept.e Percent Increase 1 490.527 0.839 0.362 0.009 
 Sample Increase 1 30.658 1.613 0.207 0.018 
  Irrl_Info* 
  Errors  
Percent Increase 1 24.190 0.041 0.839 0.000 
Sample Increase 1 5.125 0.270 0.605 0.003 
  
Irrl_Info*Skept. 
Percent Increase 1 37.053 0.063 0.802 0.001 
 Sample Increase 1 14.313 0.753 0.388 0.008 
  Errors*Skept. Percent Increase 1 487.943 0.835 0.363 0.009 
 Sample Increase 1 1.183 0.062 0.804 0.001 
  
Irrl_Info*Errors 
  *Skept. 
Percent Increase 1 0.130 0.000 0.988 0.000 
Sample Increase 1 1.869 0.098 0.755 0.001 
  Error Percent Increase 89 584.542    
 Sample Increase 89 19.005    
Notes: 
a The percent increase in the likelihood of account misstatement. 
b The increase in the number of items selected for sampling. 
c Irrl_Info is an independent variable with two levels, where in the first level irrelevant information is 
not present, and in the second level irrelevant information is present. 
d Errors is an independent variable at two levels, where in the first level minor errors are not present, 
and in the second minor level errors are present. 
e Skepticism was calculated using the Hurtt (2010) skepticism scale, and participants were separated 
into high and low groups using a median split. 
fAll p-values are two-tailed. 
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TABLE 7 
Experiment 1 Client Competency Mediation Test Results (PROCESS Model 4) 
 
Panel A – Irrelevant Information and Client Competency   
   Misstatementa Sample Sizeb   
   X to M Direct Effect X to M Direct 
Effect 
  
(Constant)    3.14 (0.20)***  62.14 (5.95)***  3.14 (0.20)***  14.96 (1.13)*** 
Irrl_Info.c    0.26 (0.29)  8.02 (4.63)*  0.26 (0.29)  2.00 (0.88)**  
Competency    -6.32 (1.61)**  -0.76 (0.31)** 
R-sq    0.01  0.15  0.01  0.10   
MSE    2.07  512.90  2.07  18.33   
F(df1, df2)    0.82 (1, 95)  8.61 (2, 94)**  0.82 (1, 95)  0.82 (2, 94)** 
Panel B – Minor Errors and Client Competency    
   Misstatement Sample Size   
   X to M Direct Effect X to M Direct 
Effect 
  
(Constant)    4.04 (0.18)***  62.95 (8.48)***  4.04 (0.18)***  14.61 (1.62)*** 
Errors   -1.52 (0.25)***  1.84 (5.52) -1.52 (0.25)***  0.96 (1.05)   
Competency   -5.72 (1.93)**  -0.52 (0.37)   
R-sq    0.28  0.13  0.28  0.06   
MSE    1.50  528.62  1.50  19.18   
F(df1, df2)    37.47 (1,95)***  6.96 (2, 94)**  37.47 (1,95)***  2.92 (2, 94)* 
         
Notes: 
a Misstatement likelihood was the dependent variable in these models. 
b Sample size was the dependent variable in these models. 
c Irrl_Info is an independent variable with two levels, where in the first level irrelevant information is not 
present, and in the second level irrelevant information is present. 
d Errors is an independent variable at two levels, where in the first level minor errors are not present, and 
in the second minor level errors are present. 
*, **, and *** denote a significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
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Company
Number of mentions on 
Google Scholar*
Tobii                                    9,230 
SensoMotoric Instruments (SMI)                                    6,040 
EyeLink                                    5,530 
ISCAN                                    2,650 
LC Technologies                                    1,130 
EyeTech                                      441 
The Eye Tribe                                      227 
Ergoneers                                      185 
Smart Eye                                      149 
Mirametrix                                        92 
Pupil Labs                                        80 
Gazepoint                                        39 
TABLE 8
Common Eye-Tracking Hardware Companies
*Per Imotion January 2017 blog.  
**Note - The number of search results shown on google scholar includes a mix of 
scholarly publications, patents, and book chapters.
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Term Definition Use
Eye Fixations A term used to describe when someone 
looks at a particular location for an 
extended period of time.
Fixations suggest attributes relevant to 
completing a decision making task. 
Saccades A term used to describe quick eye 
movements between locations or 
fixations.
Saccades are used to track eye movements 
between locations and the number of 
times participants shift between areas of 
interest.
Dwell Time A term used to describe the sum of 
fixations in one area before a participant 
moves on to the next area.
Dwell times are used to determine interest 
or confusion. Longer dwell times could 
signal confusion or higher levels of 
processing.
Areas of Interest An area of interest is an area or region of a 
visual stimulus highlighted by the 
researcher during an experiment.
Areas of interest are used to compare and 
contrast the amount of time participants 
spend on visual areas.
Gaze Plot A plot showing the sequence of a 
participant's scan through a document.
Gaze plots are used to determine the 
viewing order of objects in a visual 
stimulus in order to identify common 
trends.
Heat Map Heat maps are color coordinated maps that 
provide a visual representation of the 
viewing intensity of participants.  The 
brighter the color the longer participants 
focused on that area of the visual stimulus.
Heat maps are used to highlight areas of 
interest, and to determine where people 
focus their visual attention.
TABLE 9
Key Terms Summary
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TABLE 10 
Experiment 2 Participant Demographic Information 
(number of respondents: n = 43) 
 
Age       
   21 – 30     76.70%  
   31 – 40     18.60%  
   41 – 50       4.70%  
   51+            0%  
Is English your first language?    
   Yes     69.80%  
   No     30.20%  
Gender       
   Female     44.20%  
   Male     55.80%  
How many years of professional work experience do you have working in accounting?   
   Mean     1.18  
   Std. Dev.     2.61  
How many years of other work experience do you have?    
   Mean     6.58  
   Std. Dev.     4.77  
What is your current student status?   
   Senior     48.80%  
   Post-Baccalaureate Certificate    25.60%  
   Masters     25.60%  
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TABLE 11 
One-way Analysis of Variance for the Overall Fixation Count and Duration Across 
Treatment Conditions  
Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation) Fixation Count   
 Treatment Condition  
AOIe Controla Errorsb Irrl_Infoc 
Both Irrl_Info 
and Errors 
F (p-value) 
Customer Column 39.64 (46.83) 30.13 (17.71) 14.25 (14.96) 40.08 (24.13)  
Invoice Column 31.91 (26.47) 39.88 (27.41) 11.58 (11.01) 34.25 (28.82)  
Cust. Col. Error 1  1.63 (1.20)  3.75 (4.27)  
Cust. Col. Error 2  2.75 (3.01)  2.50 (2.20)  
Date Error  0.75 (0.89)  1.67 (2.46)  
Invoice Error  1.88 (2.59)  2.08 (2.15)  
Totals 9.09 (7.41) 9.63 (6.05) 4.17 (4.75) 10.33 (6.61)  
Overalld 
(combined) 
123.09 (87.84) 131.63 (97.39) 73.50 (40.79) 228.50 (119.45) 6.15 (0.002) 
N 11 8 12 12  
Panel B: Mean (Standard Deviation) Dwell Time 
  
 Treatment Condition  
AOI Control Errors Irrl_Info 
Both Irrl_Info 
and Errors 
F (p-value) 
Customer Column 6.55 (8.07) 4.89 (3.41) 2.50 (2.94) 8.19 (6.36)  
Invoice Column 5.53 (4.95) 7.96 (7.51) 1.75 (1.85) 7.80 (6.24)  
Cust. Col. Error 1  0.23 (0.35)  0.82 (1.12)  
Cust. Col. Error 2  0.36 (0.43)  0.50 (0.53)  
Date Error  0.15 (0.18)  0.31 (0.47)  
Invoice Error  0.42 (0.76)  0.59 (1.01)  
Totals 1.51 (1.43) 1.80 (1.51) 0.66 (0.91) 1.76 (1.32)  
Overalle 
(combined) 
21.52 (17.76) 24.85 (25.18) 12.20 (12.20) 47.04 (31.15) 5.35 (0.002) 
N 11 8 12 12  
Notes: 
a Control represents the treatment condition with no irrelevant information or minor errors were present. 
b Errors is an independent variable at two levels, where in the first level minor errors are not present, 
and in the second minor level errors are present. 
c Irrl_Info is an independent variable with two levels, where in the first level irrelevant information is 
not present, and in the second level irrelevant information is present. 
dThe Overall variable represents the number of fixations across the entire spreadsheet for all participants 
in that treatment condition. The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
eAOI represents Area of Interest. 
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TABLE 12 
Kruskal-Wallis Test Results for Fixations and Dwell Times  
Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation) Fixation 
Count 
   
 Treatment Condition  
AOIe Controla Errorsb Irrl_Infoc 
Both Irrl_Info 
and Errors 
(p-value) 
Customer Column 39.64 (46.83) 30.13 (17.71) 14.25 (14.96) 40.08 (24.13)  
Invoice Column 31.91 (26.47) 39.88 (27.41) 11.58 (11.01)      34.25 (28.82)  
Cust. Col. Error 1  1.63 (1.20)  3.75 (4.27)  
Cust. Col. Error 2  2.75 (3.01)  2.50 (2.20)  
Date Error  0.75 (0.89)  1.67 (2.46)  
Invoice Error  1.88 (2.59)  2.08 (2.15)  
Totals 9.09 (7.41) 9.63 (6.05) 4.17 (4.75) 10.33 (6.61)  
Overalld 
(combined) 
123.09 (87.84) 131.63 (97.39) 73.50 (40.79) 228.50 (119.45) (0.001) 
N 11 8 12 12  
Panel B: Mean (Standard Deviation) Dwell Time 
   
 Treatment Condition  
AOI Control Errors Irrl_Info 
Both Irrl_Info 
and Errors 
 
Customer Column 6.55 (8.07) 4.89 (3.41) 2.50 (2.94) 8.19 (6.36)  
Invoice Column 5.53 (4.95) 7.96 (7.51) 1.75 (1.85) 7.80 (6.24)  
Cust. Col. Error 1  0.23 (0.35)  0.82 (1.12)  
Cust. Col. Error 2  0.36 (0.43)  0.50 (0.53)  
Date Error  0.15 (0.18)  0.31 (0.47)  
Invoice Error  0.42 (0.76)  0.59 (1.01)  
Totals 1.51 (1.43) 1.80 (1.51) 0.66 (0.91) 1.76 (1.32)  
Overall 
(combined) 
21.52 (17.76) 24.85 (25.18) 12.20 (12.20) 47.04 (31.15) (0.001) 
N 11 8 12 12  
Notes: 
This table shows the results of the Kruskal-Wallis analysis to see if there were significant differences 
between the four treatments for the overall fixation count and dwell time. 
a Control represents the treatment condition with no irrelevant information or minor errors were present. 
b Errors is an independent variable at two levels, where in the first level minor errors are not present, 
and in the second minor level errors are present. 
c Irrl_Info is an independent variable with two levels, where in the first level irrelevant information is 
not present, and in the second level irrelevant information is present. 
dThe Overall variable represents the number of fixations or dwell time across the entire spreadsheet for 
all participants in that treatment condition. The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
eAOI represents Area of Interest. 
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*Included in the literature review
*Included in the literature review
(from Hurtt et al. 2013)
FIGURE 1
Model of Determinants of Professional Skepticism in Audit Performance 
(from Nelson 2009)
FIGURE 2
A Model of Antecedents to and Outcomes of Skeptical Judgment and Skeptical Action 
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FIGURE 3  
Proposed Interaction for Experiment 1 
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FIGURE 4 
Change in Misstatement Likelihood  
 
This figure presents the mean change in misstatement likelihood across the four 
treatment conditions. 
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FIGURE 5 
Change in Number of Items Selected 
 
This figure presents the mean change in number of items selected for sampling across 
the four treatment conditions. 
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FIGURE 6 
Experiment 1 Client Competency Analysis (PROCESS Model 4) 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  
a Errors is an independent variable at two levels, where in the first level minor errors are not present, and 
in the second minor level errors are present. 
b Client competency was measured as part of a series of debriefing questions.  It asked: “Agree or 
disagree, your review of the file increased your confidence in the client’s competence”. Answers were 
captured on a seven point Likert scale with 1 representing “strongly disagree” and 7 representing 
“strongly agree”. 
c Misstatement likelihood is the likelihood of the account being misstated. 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 (all p-values are two tailed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Errorsa Misstatement 
Likelihoodc 
Client 
Competencyb 
-5.72** -1.52*** 
10.55** (1.84) 
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Figure 7: Example of a Heat Map  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
192 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Goal-driven Attention Attention and Working Memory
   -Task Instructions    -Consideration Sets
   -Utility Effect    -Pair-wise Comparisons
   -Heuristics    -Information Complexity
   -Attention Phases    -Presentation Effects
   -Learning Effects    -Decision Difficulty
   -Time Pressure
Stimulus-driven Attention    -Distractors
   -Saliency
   -Surface Size
   -Visual Clutter
   -Position
FIGURE 8
Literature Review Organization 
Note - The category names above are from Orquin and Loose (2013).
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Figure 9: Illustration of the Experimental Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 1 – Participants sign-up for eye-tracking time slots on Sona Systems 
Step 2 – Once participants arrive at the lab they are greeted and walked through 
the consent form by the researchers 
Step 3 – Participants are led into the eye-tracking room and given an introduction 
on the software and the overall task 
Step 4 – Participants are calibrated to the eye-tracking software 
Step 5 – Participants enter their four-digit identifier into the computer and then 
view the case and audit evidence slides 
Step 6 – After reviewing the case and evidence slides participants clicked on a link 
taking them to the follow-up assessment on Qualtrics 
Step 7 – On a separate computer, participants compete the post-experiment 
questionnaire 
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Figure 10: Audit Evidence Slides with Areas of Interest Indicated 
 
Panel A - Control Condition (no irrelevant information or minor errors): 
 
 
Note: Red = Customer column, Yellow = Invoice Amount column, Blue = Invoice Total, Orange 
= Overall Spreadsheet  
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Panel B - Treatment 1 (minor errors and no irrelevant information): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Red = Customer column, Yellow = Invoice Amount column, Blue = Invoice Total, Orange 
= Overall Spreadsheet, Green = Customer column errors, Orange = Date column error, and Purple 
= Invoice column error.  
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Panel C - Treatment 2 (irrelevant information and no minor errors): 
 
Note: Red = Customer column, Yellow = Invoice Amount column, Blue = Invoice Total, Orange 
= Overall Spreadsheet 
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Panel D - Treatment 3 (both irrelevant information and minor errors): 
 
Note: Red = Customer column, Yellow = Invoice Amount column, Blue = Invoice Total, Orange 
= Overall Spreadsheet, Green = Customer column errors, Orange = Date column error, and Purple 
= Invoice column error.  
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Figure 11: Heat Maps 
Panel A – Control Condition (No irrelevant information or minor errors) 
 
Panel B – Treatment 1 (Minor errors and no irrelevant information) 
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Panel C – Treatment 2 (Irrelevant information and no minor errors) 
 
 
 
Panel D – Treatment 3 (Both irrelevant information and minor errors) 
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